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The Department of Defense (DoD) has faced significant acquisition problems over an 
extended period of time.  As noted by one GAO report, the “DoD’s major weapon system 
programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities 
than originally planned” (Sullivan, 2008).  For example, the programs that comprise the 
DoD’s Major Defense Acquisition Projects (MDAPs)1 for 2007 had an average program 
cost-growth of 26% when compared to initial estimates, which collectively culminated in 
$295 billion dollars in additional costs (Sullivan, 2008).  Given other pressing financial 
obligations, the DoD cannot afford to incur in the future similar development problems as 
it has experienced in the past. 
Cost-growth is defined as the positive difference between actual cost and budgeted costs.  
Due to its relative ease of measurement, cost-growth provides a simple barometer to 
determine if the acquisition process is achieving its stated goals.  Since the 1950s, 
numerous reports have found that, in general, the DoD’s acquisition process experiences 
high cost-growth at both the program and unit levels.   
Congress has made several attempts to implement reforms that would control program 
and unit-cost-growth, but these have not achieved their intended results.  The most direct 
policy that attempted to curtail unit-cost-growth was the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment 
(NM), which Congress implemented in 1982.  The law was significantly modified in 
2006 and 2009 (as described below). 
NM requires the DoD to report when unit-cost-growth of any major defense acquisition 
program is “known, expected, or anticipated” by a program manager to exceed certain 
cost-growth thresholds ("The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 
2009c).  More specifically, NM stipulates two levels of unit-cost-growth breach: the 
“significant” level and the “critical” level.  A significant unit-cost breach occurs if a 
program experiences cost-growth over 15% of the current baseline estimate, whereas a 
critical unit-cost breach occurs if a program experiences cost-growth of 25% over the 
                                                 
1 Major Defense Acquisition Projects are DoD’s largest programs, which represent roughly 80% of the 
DoD’s acquisition budget in a given year (Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & Sollinger, 2007). 
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current baseline estimate.  This unit-cost breach occurs if a program experiences unit-
cost-growth above specified thresholds, either as measured by total-program acquisition 
unit-cost2 (PAUC) or average procurement unit-cost3 (APUC).  
The NM law requires a program manager to fulfill specific criteria when a program 
breaches.  For a significant unit-cost breach, the “Service Secretary must notify Congress 
within 45 days after the report (normally program deviation report) upon which the 
determination is based … [and] submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with the 
required additional unit-cost breach information” (Axtell & Irby, 2007).  For a critical 
unit-cost breach, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) must fulfill all significant breach requirements, and must 
additionally certify to Congress within 60 days of the SAR that the program meets four 
criteria: (1) the system is essential to national security; (2) there are no alternatives to 
such a system that will provide equal or greater military capability at less cost; (3) the 
new estimates of the unit-cost are reasonable; and (4) the management structure for such 
a major defense system is adequate to manage and control unit-cost ("The National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 2009c).    
From 1982 to 2006, implementation of NM did not seem to have any significant impact 
on acquisition outcomes.  The most consistent criticism of NM was that the measure was 
ineffective because programs would avoid incurring an NM breach by rebaselining a 
program (i.e., establishing a new “current” baseline)—a procedure that did not require 
Congressional notification (Axtell, 2006).   
The NM statute was amended in 2006 to close the rebaselining loophole.  The new 
provision included language specifying a second condition for incurring an NM breach: 
unit-cost-growth over the original baseline estimate.  A significant unit-cost breach 
occurs when cost-growth exceeds 30% of the original baseline and a critical unit-cost 
breach occurs when cost-growth exceeds 50% of the original baseline estimate.  The 
revision did not change the reporting requirements for either the significant or critical 
unit-cost breach. 
                                                 
2 (Total Development Cost + Procurement Cost + Construction Cost) / (Total-Program Quantity) 
3 (Total Procurement Cost) / (Procurement Quantity) 
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Soon after the implementation of the 2006 NM revision, the DoD reported that 40 of the 
85 current MDAP programs were experiencing unit-cost-growth high enough to warrant 
a Nunn–McCurdy breach.  Although 25 of these programs experienced unit-cost-growth 
of over 50% relative to their original baseline, the DoD did not report programs as having 
incurred a Nunn–McCurdy breach because the National Defense Authorization Act 
permitted the “original baseline estimate to be revised to the current baseline estimate as 
of January 6, 2006” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Resources 
and Analysis), 2006).  Between 2006 and 2007, 16 additional programs experienced unit-
cost-growth high enough to incur an NM breach.  Despite the impact of the new 
legislation on the number of programs that breached, it is too soon to determine the long-
term impact of the legislation on current acquisition performance, even though the 
immediate short-term impact has been to provide greater visibility as well as to place a 
great deal more emphasis on the unit-cost-growth relative to the original program 
baseline.  
Congress again amended NM by passing the Major Weapons Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009.  This law added two requirements to the process of recertifying 
programs that incur an NM breach.  A program with an NM unit-cost breach now must 
(a) rescind the most recent Milestone approval and (b) receive a new Milestone approval 
before any actions regarding the contract may continue.  The new Milestone approval 
requires a certification that the costs of the program are reasonable, and the certification 
must be supported by an independent cost estimate that includes a confidence level for 
the estimate ("Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009," 2009).  This statute 
was implemented too recently to evaluate its impact upon the defense acquisition process.  
The authors performed several data analyses, based on limited, publicly available 
information, to determine if any reported variables were correlated in a statistically 
significant way with NM unit-cost breach.  The data analysis computed several tests of 
independence, using Fisher’s “exact test.”  This analysis produced two conclusions.  
First, the DoD’s current metrics are not useful for determining the root cause of unit-cost-
growth in acquisition programs.  Second, despite data limitations, it appears that 
programs that experience high unit-cost-growth are not randomly distributed.  Going 
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further, programs that experience an NM unit-cost breach appear to have the strongest 
relationship with two factors: dollar size of the project and the Selected Acquisition 
Report’s estimating cost category.  Programs appear much more likely to breach if the 
total-program has a large value (above $7.95 billion) and if the cost-growth is attributed 
to the estimating category, which measures the accuracy of the program’s initial 
estimates.  Conversely, programs with small total-program value (below $3.5 billion) 
appear to rarely breach. 
The report analyzed two relevant case studies: The Space-Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS) –High and the Virginia-class Submarine (SSN-774) program.  The Space-Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS)–High program highlights how the threat of an NM breach does 
not necessarily lead to improved acquisition outcomes.  The Virginia-class Submarine 
(SSN-774) program underscores how programs that experience high unit-cost-growth can 
implement policies to achieve substantial cost-reductions (i.e., take actions to avoid an 
NM breach).  
Our study resulted in eight findings: (1) unit-cost-growth has remained high since NM 
was implemented in 1982; (2) few programs incurred an NM breach until the recent 2006 
revision of the law that requires programs to consider unit-cost-growth above the 
program’s original baseline; (3) the DoD’s data collection has been inconsistent (with 
regard to definitions, moving baselines, quantities, etc.); (4) the DoD often has not 
conducted systematic analysis of root-cause problems; (5) limited and inconsistent data 
undermines an effective analysis; (6) NM may identify acquisition problems too late in 
the development process to allow program reforms to be effective; (7) NM’s 
effectiveness may be limited by its focus on the development and procurement of assets, 
as opposed to the entire lifecycle of the program; and (8) recent legislation has not been 
implemented long enough to evaluate its impact on DoD acquisition processes. 
The authors developed nine recommendations.  Regarding NM, the DoD should (1) 
develop a system to determine and distribute lessons learned from an NM breach 
throughout the DoD and (2) develop leading indicators.  In order to control cost-growth, 
the DoD should (3) fully embrace and implement the legislation in the Weapon Systems 
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Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (because prior attempts to reform DoD acquisitions have 
been ineffective in large part due to the DoD’s institutional resistance); (4) identify cost 
as a development requirement of equal importance to schedule and performance; (5) 
implement a more complete acquisition-data information system; (6) consider lifecycle 
costs when rendering acquisition decisions; (7) directly address the lack of incentives that 
allow current underlying problems to persist; (8) work with Congress to increase funding 
flexibility (e.g., being able to use production money to increase development costs, so as 
to save the far more significant unit production costs); and (9) provide programs with 
greater requirements flexibility (e.g., allowing cost/performance tradeoffs, especially for 
block I of the deployed system,4 so that the last 5–10% of performance “requirements” 
don’t double the unit-costs). 
 
 
                                                 
4 Block I refers to the assumption that, after initial fielding, the program will utilize “spiral development” to 




The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to face acquisition challenges.  As noted by 
one GAO report, the “DoD’s major weapon system programs continue to take longer, 
cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned” 
(Sullivan, 2008).  For example, the programs that comprise the DoD’s Major Defense 
Acquisition Projects (MDAPs)5 for 2007 had an average program cost-growth of 26% 
when compared to initial estimates, representing approximately $295 billion dollars in 
additional costs (Sullivan, 2008).  These programs also experienced, on average, a 21-
month delay in delivering initial capability to warfighters (Sullivan, 2008).  
Unfortunately, the DoD has experienced similar development problems since at least the 
1950s (Frank, 1997).  The DoD expects to spend approximately $935 billion dollars on 
acquisition between fiscal years 2009–2013 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009).  Given 
the nation’s other pressing financial obligations, the DoD will need to find ways to 
develop and acquire its needed capabilities more efficiently. 
The DoD has implemented several reforms to control program and unit-cost-growth.  
Congress most explicitly addressed this issue in 1982 when it implemented the Nunn–
McCurdy Amendment (NM), which established mandatory reporting requirements for 
programs that experience specified levels of unit-cost-growth.  Despite additional 
legislation—including recent revisions of NM in 2006 and 2009—defense acquisition 
projects continue to experience high unit-cost-growth.  However, it may be too early to 
fully determine the impacts of the recent revisions. 
Cost-growth 
Cost-growth is the positive difference between actual or projected cost and budgeted or 
initial estimated costs.  Thus, cost-growth can be calculated in a variety of ways, 
depending on technique.   
                                                 
5 Major Defense Acquisition Projects are DoD’s largest programs, which represent roughly 80% of the 
DoD’s acquisition budget in a given year (Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & Sollinger, 2007). 
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Although this metric is not inferential, cost-growth is widely used because it is a simple 
measure to help gauge the effectiveness of the acquisition process.  
Cost-growth Studies 
The DoD’s MDAPs have experienced high program and unit-cost-growth over an 
extended period of time.  Despite data limitations, numerous reports issued over the past 
50 years have noted high program cost-growth.  Seven of these studies are summarized in 
Figure 1.  The reports, written between 1959–2006, cover programs between 1946–2003.  
All studies adjusted program cost-growth for inflation and quantity change relative to the 
MS II baseline, although the studies did not necessarily make such adjustments in the 
same way (Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006).   
Several limitations in the analysis of our report must be noted.  First, due to differences in 
(a) calculating program cost-growth and (b) sample set characteristics (such as which 
development phases are included in analysis), the results from these studies are not 
necessarily comparable.  Second, most reports included data for ongoing programs, 
further complicating comparisons between reports.  Since ongoing programs will 
potentially experience additional program cost-growth, most reports do not account for 
the total cost-growth of a program.  Therefore, it is possible for two separate reports that 
used the same cost methods and samples sets to arrive at different results, depending on 
when the data were collected.  Third, because reports only use sample sets of programs 
that are in development during respective time periods, reports at best estimate cost-
growth for a specified time period.  At present, no comprehensive, publicly available 
analysis exists that includes most DoD projects over an extended period of time.  Finally, 
most programs use information provided by the Selected Acquisition Report, a reporting 
mechanism that has been criticized for its limitations.  The SAR and its shortcomings will 
be discussed more thoroughly in a later section.  A short summary of its drawbacks 
include (a) inconsistent reporting practices; (b) only reporting information on MDAPs, 
thereby excluding a large number of lower cost programs from analysis; and (c) 
truncating reporting once a program has either received 90% of the items it purchased or 
has expended 90% of its planned expenditures, thus not tracking costs throughout the 
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most expensive portion of a system’s life, sustainment.  Despite these limitations, an 
analysis based on the available data is better than no analysis of a situation. 
Program cost-growth is recorded as a cost-growth factor (CGF) relative to the total-
program’s original estimate.  The development CGF represents program cost-growth that 
occurred during the Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) phase of 
acquisition.  From reports that record this information, the development program cost-
growth factor ranged from 1.25 to 1.58.  The procurement CGF represents growth during 
the production of a system.  From reports that record this information, procurement CGF 
ranged from 1.18 to 1.65.  Total CGF, which includes program cost-growth that occurred 
during both the development and procurement of a program, showed a greater range of 
values—from a low of 1.14 to a high of 3.23.  In short, reports from different time 
periods all recorded high program cost-growth, although large differences existed.   
Reported Cost Growth


















Cost Growth Factor (CGF)
Development CGF Procurement CGF Total Program CGF
 
Figure 1: Graphical results of past cost-growth reports 
Source: (Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006).  
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Cost-growth Longitudinal Studies 
To properly evaluate if program cost-growth has changed over time, however, one should 
also address changes in cost-growth over time.  The authors found two such analyses, the 
results of which are reproduced in Figures 2 and 3.   
This type of analysis also has limitations.  First, these two analyses are not directly 
comparable because the authors of the analyses utilized different methodologies (more 
specifically, the authors of the first study did not adjust for changes in quantity, whereas 
the authors of the second study did).  Second, both analyses include programs that are 
still in development.  These programs may experience additional cost changes before 
completion of the program, potentially underreporting cost-growth.  Third, and related to 
the prior concern, programs grouped by decade are likely to display selection effects.  
More specifically, ongoing programs in the decade closest to a report’s publication are 
likely to underestimate program cost-growth because programs represented are at a 
relatively early part of their lifecycles.  For this reason, the data for programs initiated 
closest to the publication of the report should be viewed with the most skepticism.  
Fourth, these analyses do not include data about those programs currently under 
development.  Such programs would be most indicative of current acquisition trends.  
Finally, as most MDAPs are acquired over decades, a longitudinal analysis may be of 
limited usefulness in determining the effectiveness of singular policies.  New policies are 
unlikely to be fully effective for those programs that have already been in development 
for an extended period of time, due in large part to prior programmatic decisions, 
potentially undermining the perceived impact of a specific policy.  Clarity can also be 
obscured in the long-run, however, because acquisition policies tend to turn over faster 
than the DoD’s acquisition portfolio.  Nonetheless, as asserted before, examination of a 
limited analysis is superior to the absence of analysis. 
The first study is entitled The Effects of Management Initiatives on the Cost and 
Schedules of Defense Acquisition Programs and was issued by the Institute for Defense 
Analyses in 1992.  This study analyzed 100 programs for their development cost-growth 
and a subset of 82 programs for their production cost-growth.  Only programs that had 
been in full-scale development for at least three years were analyzed for development 
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cost-growth, and only programs that had been in full-scale production for at least three 
years were analyzed for production cost-growth.  The report noted that “nearly all 
programs in the sample are either still in production and in service, or are previous 
versions of weapon systems that are still in production or in service” (Tyson, Om, 
Gogerty, Nelson, & Utech, 1992).  Although the report provided information regarding 
the causes of cost-growth in the development phase, similar information was not 
provided for the procurement phase.  The results of this study are represented in Figure 2.  
A quick analysis across time reveals that development cost-growth has apparently shrunk 
moderately between the 1960s and 1980s.  Production and total cost-growth appears to 
shrink between the 1960s and the early 1970s, but rebounds by the late 1970s (more 
recent data is less likely to be reliable, for reasons noted above).  Although development 
cost-growth in the late 1970s and 1980s is lower than the 1960s and early 1970s, these 
eras are more likely to see an increase in program cost-growth because such programs 
were still relatively early in their lifecycles at the time the report was issued in 1992.  For 
instance, the report noted that the projects of the 1980s experienced, on average, a 32% 
delay in development schedule.  This is a strong indicator that program cost-growth will 
increase significantly in the future—although the extent of this growth is uncertain.  
Overall, it is clear that program cost-growth has remained at very high levels throughout 
the time period considered.  Although program cost-growth may have improved during 
the early 1970s, it appears unlikely that program cost-growth decreased significantly over 
the time period considered. 
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Total Program Cost Growth





Overall  Cost 
Growth
 
Figure 2: Institute for Defense Analyses, “The Effects of Management Initiatives on the Cost and 
Schedules of Defense Acquisition Programs” study results (1992)  
Source: (Tyson, Om, Gogerty, Nelson, & Utech, 1992) 
The second report is entitled Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing? A Quantitative 
Assessment of Completed and Ongoing Programs and was issued by the RAND 
Corporation in 2007.  This report analyzed development cost-growth for complete and 
ongoing programs.  The report analyzed 46 completed projects (defined as cessation of 
SAR reporting) and 33 ongoing programs (limited to programs that were at least five 
years beyond Milestone B).  The results of the study are reproduced in Figure 3.   
The RAND report reported cost-growth was adjusted for changes in quantity.  From the 
SAR data, the RAND report’s authors developed a “cost improvement curve (CIC) to 
rationalize the quantity actually procured with that of the baseline estimate … [by 
adjusting] the baseline estimate procurement costs from the baseline’s estimated quantity 
to the program’s final quantity” (Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & Sollinger, 
2007).   
In Figure 3, the leftmost column (white) indicates the development cost-growth for 
completed programs.  According to their analysis, development cost-growth was almost 
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80% in the 1970s and 60% in the 1980s.  Development cost-growth dropped off 
markedly in the 1990s, but, as noted in the report, this observation is mainly due to 
selection effects—few programs started in the 1990s were completed during that decade, 
indicating those programs that were completed (a) had a shorter development cycle and 
(b) did not face significant cost-growth.  As a result, the leftmost column (completed 
programs) does not provide an accurate reflection of development cost-growth for all 
programs in development during the 1990s. 
































Figure 3: RAND Corporation, Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing? A Quantitative Assessment 
of Completed and Ongoing Programs study results (2007) 
Source: (Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & Sollinger, 2007) 
 
The second column (black) in Figure 3 analyzes the same group of completed programs 
but at a similar stage of development, at five years past development Milestone B.6  
Development cost-growth was about 50% in the 1970s, 35% in the 1980s, and 20% in the 
1990s.  The indication is that programs five years past the MS B decision point continued 
to experience development cost-growth.  Although development cost-growth again 
appears to fall considerably between the 1970s and 1990s, the authors of the RAND 
report again note that the data should not be taken wholly at face value.  In short, the 
relatively small number of programs that begun and completed development in the 1990s 
are likely to have several traits that distinguish themselves from the normal portfolio of 
                                                 
6 Milestone B is a program checkpoint that the DoD requires for a program in order to move from the 
technology and development phase to the system development and demonstration phase. 
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DoD development programs.  For example, these programs likely had short development 
cycles and did not experience significant schedule delays and cost-growth.  As a result, 
the second column in Figure 3 does not necessarily provide an accurate reflection of 
development cost-growth for all programs in development during the 1990s. 
The third column (grey) in Figure 3 analyzes all programs in the dataset, both completed 
and ongoing, at five years past MS B.  Development cost-growth was approximately 50% 
in the 1970s, 35% in the 1980s, and 50% in the 1990s.  This column more accurately 
indicates development cost-growth because it includes those programs most likely to 
experience high development cost-growth—the ongoing programs.  This analysis appears 
to provide a credible evaluation of the cost-growth trend.  From this information, it 
appears that development cost-growth improved between the 1970s and 1980s, but 
returned to the 1970s level by the 1990s.   
The fourth (diagonal right stripes) and fifth (diagonal left stripes) columns in Figure 3 
attempt to adjust for differences in development cost-growth over time due to the types of 
systems being acquired because development cost-growth has historically differed 
substantially between different types of weapons (Tyson, Om, Gogerty, Nelson, & Utech, 
1992).  The fourth column adjusted development cost-growth to approximate the 1970s 
mix of programs, whereas the fifth column did so for the 1990s mix of programs.  RAND 
calculated these columns by “normalizing the contribution of each program type to [the 
development cost-growth factor] based on the proportions in the 1970s or the 1990s” 
(Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & Sollinger, 2007).  Programs were divided into 
three categories: (a) aircraft and helicopters; (b) launch vehicles and satellites; and (c) 
missiles, electronics, and all other programs.  The 1970s mix was approximately 39% 
missiles and electronics programs, 50% aircraft and helicopters programs, and 11% space 
programs, whereas the 1990s mix was approximately 66% missiles and electronics 
programs, 25% aircraft and helicopters programs, and 9% space programs. 
The fourth column adjusted development cost-growth to approximate the 1970s mix of 
programs, measured at five years beyond MS B.  This analysis produces relatively similar 
development cost-growth factors over time, with the 1970s and 1980s having a value of 
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1.5 and the 1990s having a factor of 1.6.  By this analysis, development cost-growth 
increased slightly over the time period considered.  The fifth column adjusted 
development cost-growth to approximate the mix of programs developed during the 
1990s, again measured at five years beyond MS B.  These results were the opposite of the 
fourth column: development cost-growth was highest in the 1970s (1.6), but it decreased 
during the 1980s and 1990s to 1.5.  This analysis appears to show that development cost-
growth has improved modestly since the 1970s for the data considered.  But, as pointed 
out above, the 1990s column includes innovative, young, ongoing programs that are more 
likely than older programs to experience development cost-growth.  As a result, 
depending on the outcome of programs currently in development, the 1990s may 
ultimately experience more development cost-growth than the other two decades.  
Cost-growth Analyses Conclusion 
In conclusion, both of these longitudinal studies found that programs experienced high 
cost-growth—at least 50% over initial estimates—for an extended period of time.  
Perhaps more important, neither report identities a significant difference in the trend of 
program cost-growth over time (Younossi, Arena, Leonard, Roll, Jain, & Sollinger, 2007) 
(Tyson, Om, Gogerty, Nelson, & Utech, 1992).  This finding is broadly supported by 
other cost-growth studies in both the private and public sectors (Ioannis A. Stratogiannis, 
and Christos K. Zahos 2008) (Government Accounting Office, 1981) (Schinasi, 2008).  
Reasons for Cost-growth 
Reports have noted numerous reasons for persistent acquisition difficulties.  For example, 
in Congressional Testimony Clark Murdock, Ph.D., Senior Adviser Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), stated that the true root of the problem is that “the 
underlying incentive structure for defense acquisition is profoundly dysfunctional” 
(Murdock, 2008).  A typical list of problems includes frequent requirements change, 
optimistically low estimates of program cost at project initiation, minimal use of risk 
estimates, use of immature technologies, production cycle stretch out, and poor 
management of contractors (Erwin, 2008).  Figure 4 provides a more detailed list of 
reasons for program and unit-cost-growth.  Due to the interrelated nature of many of 
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these problems, which compound in effect, it is difficult to select one specific cause for 
cost-growth. 
Interrelated Development Difficulties 
Although less reported than cost-growth difficulties, DoD faces similarly significant 
troubles delivering systems on schedule and at initial performance specifications.  More 
often than not, problems with one of these three interrelated aspects frequently results in 
other cascading negative effects.  For example, “delays in providing capabilities to the 
warfighter result in the need to operate costly legacy systems longer than expected, find 
alternatives to fill capability gaps, or go without the capability” (Sullivan, 2008).  In this 
way, one program’s schedule delay will likely lead to cost-growth, and possibly a 
reduction in capability for a program in development.  Similarly, high-cost weapons 
growth leads to reduction in the number of units for a project or precludes the opportunity 
to invest in other projects, while fewer quantities of systems lower the capability of the 
military and increase the unit-cost of remaining items (a compounding effect).  Because 
these acquisition difficulties are interrelated, programs that face challenges are rarely able 




Problem Areas Specific Problems 
Requirements 
Definition 
- Poor initial requirements definition 
- Poor performance/cost tradeoffs during development 
- Changes in quantity requirements 
Cost Estimating - Errors due to limitations of cost-estimating procedures 
- Failure to understand and account for technical risks 
- Poor inflation estimates 
- Top down pressure to reduce estimates 
- Lack of valid independent cost estimates 
Program 
Management 
- Lack of program management expertise 
- Mismanagement/human error 
- Over optimism 
- Schedule concurrency 
- Program stretch-outs to keep production lines open  
Contracting - Lack of competition 
- Contractor buy-in (to win competition) 
- Use of wrong type of contract 
- Inconsistent contract management/administrative procedures 
- Too much contractor oversight and too many reporting requirements 
- Waste 
- Excess profits 
- Contractors overstaffed 
- Unreasonable indirect costs for contractors  
- Taking too long to resolve undefinitized contracts 
Budget - Funding instabilities within the DoD caused by trying to fund too 
many programs 
- Funding instabilities caused by Congressional decisions 
- Inefficient production rates due to stretching out programs 
- Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)—formerly DSARC—out of 
synchronization with the Services' Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) cycle 
- Failure to fund for management reserve 
- Failure to fund programs at most likely cost 
Technical - Use of immature technologies 
- Adherence to strict performance requirements 
- Reliance on proprietary information 
Figure 4: Reasons for Cost-growth 
 
The information in this chart, except for the Technical subcategory, largely reflects the 
research of Harry M. Calcutt, Jr., presented in Cost Growth in DoD Major Programs: A 





II. The Defense Acquisition Reporting System 
To better track costs and performance of defense acquisition programs, Congress has 
mandated, and the DoD has implemented, a number of reporting requirements that 
comprise the current defense acquisition reporting system.  The primary purpose of this 
system is to provide decision-makers with timely, accurate, and consistent data so that 
they can make the most informed decisions possible regarding acquisition projects.   
To achieve its goal, one of the principle objectives of the acquisition reporting system is 
to provide a mechanism to identify cost-growth and other development problems as early 
as possible.  Different diagnoses require different solutions.  In general, acquisition cost-
growth could be primarily attributed to (1) estimate problems or (2) non-estimate 
problems.   
Estimate problems indicate that cost estimates—particularly initial estimates—are overly 
optimistic.  Poor estimates at the start of a program for cost, schedule, and performance 
produce an unsustainable development path.  In this scenario, even if a program is 
managed optimally, the lack of required resources is likely to lead to an unsatisfactory 
program outcome.    
The non-estimation category refers to all other issues that may contribute to cost-growth.  
Inefficiencies could arise due to managerial, technical, legal, budgetary, and/or cultural 
barriers that do not allow program offices to effectively manage their programs.  The 
solutions to this broader set of barriers would be more complex.  A comprehensive 
solution is likely to include several changes, such as enhanced training for program 
managers and reduced legal and budgetary limitations to effective acquisition.      
Although acquisition difficulties are, to some degree, a product of both types of 
problems, as of yet no consensus exists regarding which type of problem is the principal 




History of the Acquisition Reporting System Prior to the Implementation of the 
Nunn–McCurdy Amendment (1967–1982) 
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) 
One of the first defense acquisition reform efforts was the introduction of the Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR).   
The DoD first introduced the SAR in 1967 as an internal reporting mechanism.  In 1969, 
Congress mandated periodic status reports on major DoD programs (Leach, 2002).  To 
fulfill this requirement, the DoD submitted the SAR.  In 1977, Congress passed the Fiscal 
Year 1976/7T Authorization Act that established the SAR as a legal reporting document.  
Several years later, in 1983, Congress required all Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
to submit SARs (Axtell, 2008).  Over time, Congress would add additional requirements 
to the SAR.  
Today, according to the United States Code, the purpose of the SAR is “to provide to the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives the information such Committees need to perform their 
oversight functions” ("The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 
2009a).  The SAR includes information such as a summarization of weapons development 
and procurement schedules; the current program acquisition and procurement unit-costs, 
along with the history of such costs; a full lifecycle cost analysis; and any other 
information deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Defense ("The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 2009a).  At the time of the SAR’s 
implementation, government agencies believed that “cost estimating is the key ingredient 
in reducing cost-growth” and that the SAR would improve such estimates by providing 
the DoD with its first department-wide acquisition reporting system (Sheley, 1982).  
More specifically, the information the SAR provided would allow decision-makers to 
evaluate the performance of acquisition projects, including determining if cost estimates 
were biased.  
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The DoD is required to submit a SAR for Major Defense Acquisition Projects (MDAPs), 
described in more detail below, at least once a year.  This SAR report is due 60 days after 
the President’s budget is released.  If a program faces a problem—more specifically, a 
15% increase in program acquisition or procurement unit-cost, or a six-month delay in 
program schedule—then the program must submit a SAR every fiscal quarter of the year, 
within 45 days after the end of the quarter.  The quarterly report requires more detailed 
information than the annual report, including reasons why the program deviated from its 
current estimates.  The final SAR is issued when a program has either received 90% of the 
items purchased or spent 90% of its planned expenditures (Axtell, 2008).   
Definition of a Major Defense Acquisition Project (MDAP) 
To clarify which programs it desired information on, Congress legally defined a Major 
Defense Acquisition Project (MDAP) in 1987.  A MDAP is defined as a not highly 
classified DoD program that is either “designated by the Secretary of Defense as a major 
defense acquisition program; or … estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an 
eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than 
$300,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) or an eventual total 
expenditure for procurement of more than $1,800,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1990 
constant dollars)”  ("The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 
2009b).  In 2008 dollars, a program qualifies as an MDAP if it has either an RDT&E cost 
of $486 million or a procurement cost of $2.918 billion.  
SAR Limitations 
As originally implemented, the SAR had a number of limitations that undermined its 
effectiveness.  Issues included inconsistent definitions of recorded metrics due to 
different agency reporting policies and procedures, resulting in data that were 
incomparable between projects, and, sometimes, for a given project over time (Bowsher, 
1982) (Sipple, 2002); incomplete and fragmented recording of data, limiting timeliness 
and consistency of data for analysis (Hough, 1992); and an oversight agency’s limited 
access to the SAR data due to unnecessary classification of information (Government 
Accountability Office, 2005).  Because of these limitations, implementation of the SAR 
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has not (a) significantly increased acquisition transparency or (b) helped to substantially 
reduce acquisition difficulties. 
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III. Nunn–McCurdy Amendment  
Concerned with persistent program and unit-cost increases in defense acquisition 
projects, Congress amended the 1982 Defense Authorization Act with the Nunn–
McCurdy Amendment (NM).  NM required the DoD to report, through the SAR, when 
unit-cost-growth of any major defense acquisition program was “known, expected, or 
anticipated” by a program manager to exceed certain unit-cost-growth thresholds ("The 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 2009c).  The explicit purpose 
of the amendment was to help curb unit-cost-growth in acquisition projects.  Congress 
made the amendment permanent in 1983.  The statute would later be significantly 
modified in 2006 and 2009. 
The original NM provision stipulated two levels of unit-cost-growth breach, the 
significant level and the critical level.  A significant unit-cost breach occurred if a 
program experienced cost-growth over 15% of the current baseline estimate, whereas a 
critical unit-cost breach occurred if a program experienced cost-growth over 25% of the 
current baseline estimate.  A unit-cost breach occurs if a program experiences unit-cost-
growth above specified thresholds, as measured by either program acquisition unit-cost7 
(PAUC) or average procurement unit-cost8 (APUC).  For a significant unit-cost breach, 
the relevant “Service Secretary must notify Congress within 45 days after the [finding] 
(normally program deviation report) upon which the determination is based … [and] 
submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with the required additional unit-cost breach 
information” (Axtell & Irby, 2007).  For a critical breach, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) must fulfill all significant 
breach requirements and must additionally certify to Congress within 60 days of the SAR 
that the program meets four criteria: (1) the system is essential to the national security; 
(2) there are no alternatives to the system that will provide equal or greater military 
capability at less cost; (3) the new unit-cost estimate is reasonable; and (4) the 
management structure for the program is adequate to manage and control unit-cost ("The 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," 2009c).     
                                                 
7 (Total Development Cost + Procurement Cost + Construction Cost) / (Total Program Quantity) 
8 (Total Procurement Cost) / (Procurement Quantity) 
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Reporting requirements that use NM breach thresholds 
The breach thresholds established by the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment are recorded in 
several DoD-issued requirements, including the SAR, the Unit Cost Report (UCR), and 
the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).  The UCR fulfilled the DoD’s obligation under 
NM to record additional unit-cost information.  The UCR is primarily concerned with 
reporting unit-cost, schedule, or performance information that has occurred or is expected 
to occur (Land 2006).  The APB is the DoD requirement to establish an official baseline 
for acquisition programs. 
Nunn–McCurdy Shortfalls 
NM has been criticized for not fulfilling its purpose: to increase transparency into the 
defense acquisition system, thereby lowering the unit-cost-growth.  Shortly after its 
passage, many government and private evaluations echoed the belief stated by Charles 
Bowsher, then-Comptroller General of the United States, that “(1) cost growth remains a 
serious problem—it is not under control after decades of recognition … and (2) overall, 
the cost-growth problem is as serious now as it ever was” (Bowsher, 1984).  Overall, the 
acquisition difficulties that the DoD typically faced before the implementation of NM 
have persisted since the reporting mechanism was put into operation.  The DoD continues 
to acquire systems that had higher cost, lower performance, and delayed schedules when 
compared to original estimates.  
Congress believed the implementation of NM would solve three apparent problems with 
the acquisition system.  First, the DoD did not provide enough information for Congress 
to properly manage the acquisition process.  With more information, Congress would 
have been able to make better decisions.  Second, the current process did not provide 
Congress and other oversight agencies with enough forewarning of impending acquisition 
problems.  With an earlier warning, program managers (and, if need be, Congress) would 
have been able to intervene to solve small problems before the troubles escalated.  
Finally, the reporting system before NM provided few, if any, disincentives to discourage 
poor acquisition outcomes.  Implementation of a significant deterrent effect—
automatically shutting down an acquisition project unless Congress intervened—would 
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have provided the DoD and private industry with sufficient reason to reform acquisition 
procedures to minimize the likelihood of program failure.   
NM has not been able to solve these three perceived problems.  First, although NM has 
provided Congress with more information, it has not necessarily furnished Congress with 
more useful information that has resulted in better acquisition outcomes.  Second, 
Congress has not received more timely information since the implementation of NM.  
Most programs have avoided reporting unit-cost difficulties when rebaselining a 
program.  Reestablishing the baseline does not require Congressional notification.  For 
this reason, many believe that the DoD has abused the rebaselining practice, and, thus, 
they have not systemically reported unit-cost-growth to Congress (Axtell, 2006).  
Another concern is that although NM stated that the DoD should inform Congress when a 
program was expected to incur high unit-cost-growth, Congress is usually informed only 
once a unit-cost breach has occurred.  By not providing timely information, Congress has 
been unable to take preemptive action.  Third, NM did not provide a deterrent effect 
because few programs have incurred an NM breach, and those that do are “rarely … 
canceled outright under this provision … [because] Congress normally regards the 
explanations from the Secretary of Defense as acceptable” to reauthorize programs 
(Erwin 2008).   
Impact of original Nunn–McCurdy Amendment 
With the shortfalls of NM and the DoD’s persistent acquisition troubles, it is difficult to 
assess the impact of NM on the performance of the acquisition process.  Simply put, the 
same problems that oversight entities have with acquisition reporting data—information 
that is inaccurate, inconsistent, or unavailable—also hinder their ability to properly 
evaluate the usefulness of this data.  Further complicating the matter, numerous 
acquisition reforms in a relatively short period of time make it difficult to determine the 
precise impact of any one reform effort.  Therefore, even if NM did reduce program cost-
growth (which is not incompatible with an increase in overall unit-cost-growth, spurred 
by other acquisition problems), it would be difficult to infer such a conclusion from the 
data available.  
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The relevant literature reflects the paucity of information regarding the impact of NM.  
To date, only one article that discusses the impact of NM on defense acquisition 
specifically has been published, although its focus is on defense acquisition reform more 
broadly.  This article states that NM “had no affect on R&D cost overruns; but, holding 
all else constant was responsible for a 15 percent reduction of procurement cost overruns 
between 1982 and 1986” (Smirnoff & Hicks, 2008).  The authors openly acknowledge, 
however, that their findings on the effect of acquisition process reforms in aggregate run 
broadly counter to the findings of other papers.  Most authors argue that “despite the 
implementation of more than two dozen regulatory and administration initiatives, there 
has been no substantial improvement in the cost performance of defense programs for 
more than 30 years” (Christensen, Searle, & Vickery, 1999).  To date, no published 
papers discussing the sole impact of NM breach requirements on the defense acquisition 
process have been found.  
The Packard Commission and the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 
Dissatisfied with continual defense acquisition problems, President Reagan established 
the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense (also known as the Packard 
Commission) to study and make recommendations on DoD operations and management.  
The Commission issued its findings in 1986.  Congress implemented many of the 
Packard Commission’s recommendations in an expansive DoD reform bill known as the 
Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986.  
Acquisition Program Baseline  
One new requirement the Goldwater–Nichols Act implemented was the need for MDAPs 
to “document program goals prior to program initiation” (Land, 2006).  The Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB) fulfills this mandate.  The APB includes objective and threshold 
values for program parameters—including cost, schedule, and performance—that the 
program manager is then expected to meet over the course of the project.  If a deviation 
from the APB occurs, then the program has 90 days to (1) realign the program within the 
original APB parameters, (2) approve a new APB that changes the individual parameters 
affected, or (3) conduct a review for a more extensive APB reform.  If none of these 
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solutions has occurred, then a formal program review is to take place (Land, 2006).  The 
purpose of the APB is to have a clearly defined baseline to compare the actual 
development of a project with the projected development.  If a proper APB is established 
for a project with a relatively short time horizon, then there should be minimal 
differences between the prediction and outcome. 
2006 Revision of the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment 
From the time it was passed until 2006, the Nunn–McCurdy statute was essentially 
unaltered.  Displeased with acquisition results, Congress added a new provision to the 
statute in the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act that was signed into 
law in January 2006.  As noted above, NM was criticized as ineffective in part because 
programs would usually rebaseline to avoid an NM breach.  This loophole existed 
because the NM statute only considers unit-cost-growth over the current baseline 
estimate.  Congress specifically addressed this loophole in its 2006 revision of NM by 
adding a second condition for incurring an NM breach: unit-cost-growth over the original 
baseline estimate.  A significant unit-cost breach occurs when cost-growth exceeds 30% 
of the original baseline and a critical unit-cost breach occurs when cost-growth exceeds 
50% of the original baseline estimate.  The revision did not change the reporting 
requirements for either the significant or critical unit-cost breach. 




Figure 5: Program Cost and Schedule Breach Parameters  





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impact of 2006 Nunn–McCurdy Amendment Revision 
Between 2000 and 2004, the SAR Summary Tables reported six programs as having 
experienced a Nunn–McCurdy unit-cost breach.  In September 2001, the Navy Area 
Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program became the first program to be 
terminated for a Nunn–McCurdy breach (U.S. Department of Defense Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 2002).  In 2005, the DoD reported that 
40 of the 85 MDAPs reported by the SAR Summary Tables experienced unit-cost-growth 
high enough to warrant a Nunn–McCurdy breach.  Although 25 of these programs 
experienced over 50% unit-cost-growth over their original baseline, the DoD did not 
report programs as having incurred a Nunn–McCurdy breach because the National 
Defense Authorization Act permitted the “original baseline estimate to be revised to the 
current baseline estimate as of January 6, 2006” (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition Resources and Analysis), 2006).  In the two subsequent years, 2006 
and 2007, the SAR Summary Tables cited 16 programs for incurring unit-cost-growth in 
excess of 15%, although not all were necessarily reported to have experienced unit-cost 
breaches.  Moreover, a number of programs that had unit-cost-growth in excess of 15% in 
2005—some that breached and some that were rebaselined—would breach in 2006 or 
2007.  These programs included Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GLMRS), C-
130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP), Chemical Demilitarization 
(Chemical Materials Agency, Chemical Demilitarization CMA), Expeditionary Fighting 
Vehicle (EFV), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), and Joint Primary 
Aircraft Training System (JPATS) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition Resources and Analysis), 2007, 2008).  Appendix I lists all programs that 
reported unit-cost-growth or a Nunn–McCurdy breach between the years 1998 and 2008. 
By eliminating the rebaselining loophole, the new NM statute has, at the minimum, made 
it clearer to observers of the defense acquisition process that many acquisition projects 
have not been developed within their original program estimates.  The sheer number of 
programs that have experienced significant development difficulties indicates systemic 
problems with the defense acquisition process.  If not targeted and corrected, then there is 
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little reason to believe that future development results will differ substantially from poor 
outcomes experienced in the past. 
What is less clear, however, is whether the revised NM has provoked a fundamental 
enough change in acquisition efforts to improve transparency and, subsequently, 
acquisition outcomes.  Currently, not enough time has elapsed, nor has enough data been 
collected, to determine if (1) programs that do incur an NM unit-cost breach are more 
likely to follow a sustainable path than were programs that breached prior to the NM 
revision, or (2) new programs have started on an initially more sustainable development 
path than programs started in years prior.  Although current acquisition difficulties 
remain high, the longevity of programs that comprise the existing acquisition portfolio 
means that even if the NM revision has produced positive change, improved results will 
likely take several years to identify.  At present, the most immediate short-term impact of 
the new legislation has been to provide greater visibility as well as a great deal more 
emphasis on the unit-cost-growth, relative to the original program baseline. 
2009 Nunn–McCurdy Legislation 
The Major Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, signed into law in May 
2009, made several additional revisions to improve the “organization and procedures of 
the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major weapon systems” ("Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009," 2009).  The statute established several DoD 
Directors with responsibilities over specific portions of the Research, Development, Test 
& Evaluation process as well as enhanced the use of cost estimates.  Additionally, 
Section 204 of the act specifically amended the Nunn–McCurdy Act, including adding 
two requirements to the process of recertifying programs that incur an NM breach.  A 
program with an NM breach now must (a) rescind the most recent Milestone approval 
and (b) receive a new Milestone approval before any actions regarding the contract may 
continue.  The new Milestone approval requires a certification that the costs of the 
program are reasonable, and the certification must be supported by an independent cost 
estimate that includes a confidence level for the estimate ("Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009," 2009).  This statute was implemented too recently to evaluate its 
impact upon the defense acquisition process.  
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IV. Data Analysis 
We conducted a data analysis using the information provided by the Selected Acquisition 
Report Summary Table for December 2007 (the most recent full-year set of data 
available when the study began).9  The SAR Summary Table can be found in Appendix II.  
Because only a single SAR Summary Table was used, the information reflects a snapshot 
in time of DoD acquisition efforts.  Although there is the possibility that the data do not 
represent the typical cross-section of the DoD’s acquisition efforts, significant differences 
are unlikely because the MDAP profile typically does not change substantially over short 
periods of time.  As part of our analysis, we conducted tests of independence on six 
groups of contingency tables.   
The purpose of this analysis was to (a) highlight the limitations of SAR data for 
determining the root causes of cost-growth and (b) make limited inferences based on the 
available information.   
In the data analysis, we computed several tests of independence using Fisher’s exact test.  
Fisher’s exact test is useful for calculating the exact probability of a given outcome when 
a small sample size exists.10  More specifically, Fisher’s exact test determines the 
“probability of getting a table as strong as the observed or stronger simply due to the 
chance of sampling” (Garson, 2008).  The interpretation of the test’s p-value 0.0x is that 
there is an x% chance that given the information provided in the contingency table, one 
would randomly draw an outcome as strong or stronger than the sample provided.  As 
with a chi-square test of independence, the 95% confidence level is used to determine if a 
test result is statistically significant. 
In the following results, we used the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
NM breach and the other variable.  The alternative hypothesis was a form of the 
statement, “a relationship exists between NM breach and variable x.”  Only programs in 
                                                 
9 The other reporting mechanisms for unit-cost, APB and UCR, are not publicly available. As a result, the 
SAR Summary Tables were the only source used to determine whether a program had incurred an NM 
breach.  
10 A chi-square test of independence would have been inappropriate because it is an approximation of the 
independence calculation, which is not accurate for small sample sizes. 
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development three years or longer as of the December 2007 SAR were included in the 
analysis, so as to avoid including programs too new to have developed significant 
development difficulties.  Prior SAR Summary Tables were consulted to determine 
whether a program had incurred an NM breach.  The December 2007 SAR Summary 
Table lists 71 programs that were in development for at least three years. 
We conducted two sets of analyses.  The first set of analysis counted a program as having 
breached if, and only if, an SAR Summary Table specifically stated that a program 
breached.  More specifically, this analysis excluded the 25 programs that reported 50% 
unit-cost-growth or more in 2005 but were rebaselined to avoid an NM breach—unless 
the program incurred an NM breach at some other point in time.  The second set of data 
designated programs as having incurred an NM breach if an SAR Summary Table stated 
either (a) the program had breached or (b) the program would have breached if not 
rebaselined.  Programs that established new original baselines following the 2006 
revision of NM (more specifically, the F-22 Raptor and Warfighter Information Network-
tactical) were classified as too recent to be analyzed because the current SAR Summary 
Tables do not provide the information necessary to ensure that those programs were 
tracked consistently across time.  More precisely, it would have been very difficult to 
determine what changes in cost took place due to differences in performance expectations 
between the two original baselines without additional information.  If a program had 
incurred more than one NM breach, then the highest breach was recorded.   
The first set contains 18 programs that experienced an NM breach at some point during 
development, whereas the second set contains 31 programs that recorded unit-cost-
growth high enough to warrant an NM breach.  All Fisher’s exact tests are considered as 
statistically significant unless otherwise indicated. 
We acknowledge that Fisher’s exact test only offered limited insight into the data - a 
simple determination of whether two conditions are likely to be independent of one 
another.  At best, one would be able to assert that two categories are correlated with one 
another.  Such correlation, however, does not imply causation.  Nonetheless, the authors 




The first set analyzes 18 of the 71 programs that have incurred an NM breach at some 
point during development.   
For the first analysis, we included a corresponding contingency table in the data analysis 
section.  Thereafter, corresponding contingency tables can be found in Appendix III.  
Breach by Service  
There appear to be large differences in the likelihood of breach as determined by Service, 
shown in Figure 6 (and reproduced in Figure 11).  Whereas only 3 out of 28 Navy 
programs experienced a breach (11%), 4 out of 8 DoD programs did so (50%).  Fisher’s 
exact test produced a one-sided p-value of 0.001, which is statistically significant at the 
5% confidence level.  Put another way, there is only a 0.1% chance that one would 
randomly draw an outcome as strong as or stronger than the sample provided, given the 
information provided.  Therefore, it is unlikely that this outcome happened due to chance 
alone.  It appears that discernable differences exist in project development across the 
Services.  From the information provided, one can infer that in 2007, the Navy performed 
better than average, whereas the Army was average and the Air Force and the DoD were 
above average (i.e., had significantly inferior performance), although this analysis does 
not clarify the root cause of why such differences may exist.   
 Breach No breach Total 
Army 3 9 12
Navy 3 25 28
Air Force 8 15 23
DoD 4 4 8
Total 18 53 71
P-value: 0.001 
Figure 6: Small NM group, NM breach by service 
 
Breach by Quantity Change 
There also appear to be wide disparities in the likelihood of breach, depending on 
whether a project changes the quantity of units to be purchased.  Out of the 25 programs 
that did not alter quantity, only 2 breached.  While only 4 out of 21 programs that 
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increased quantity incurred a breach, 12 out of the 13 programs that decreased quantity 
experienced a breach.  The one-sided p-value was 0.000, indicating that there was less 
than 0.0% probability that this sample was randomly drawn.  Although the SAR Summary 
Tables adjust the cost of the program for changes in quantity, those that decrease quantity 
appear much more likely to breach.  One possible interpretation is that the unit-cost 
change equation is biased against programs with small quantities, although later analysis 
undermines the likelihood of this explanation.  Alternatively, the correlation may indicate 
that programs that experience an NM breach are either more likely to reduce quantity in 
order to stay within program unit-cost thresholds or to reduce quantity after incurring a 
breach.  As a result, it appears that cost-growth is the cause of quantity reduction rather 
than the result (see Appendix III, Figure 12). 
Breach by Baseline Value Size of Program  
Another important factor regarding the likelihood of breach may be the value size of a 
program.  We converted programs into FY 2008 dollars to allow appropriate comparison.  
Using the baseline estimates, we broke up programs into three roughly equal categories: 
those under $3.5 billion, those between $3.5 billion–$7.950 billion, and those above 
$7.950 billion.  Only 2 of the 21 programs under $3.5 billion breached, whereas 16 of the 
48 programs that were over $3.5 billion breached.  For this test, there was a 3.9% 
likelihood that the sample was randomly drawn.  Breaking down the numbers further, 9 
of the 24 programs between the values of $3.5 billion–$7.95 billion and 7 of the 24 
programs valued at $7.95 billion or more breached.  This three-group sample had a 0.4% 
chance of being randomly drawn.  Overall, it appears that those programs with lower 
initial values were less likely to breach than were programs that were more expensive at 
program initiation.  The indication is that smaller programs have incurred less unit-cost-
growth than larger programs, either due to better program management or more realistic 
estimates.   
One possible explanation is that MDAPs with lower values are more likely to have the 
characteristics of successful acquisition program because they attempt to achieve only 
moderate improvements in performance over what is currently deployed, whereas larger 
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programs that breach more often attempt to develop assets with revolutionary capability.  
For example, the C-130J, which has experienced no unit-cost-growth difficulties, is a 
modest modernization program that updates certain aspects of the C-130 aircraft, which 
has been in service since the 1950s.  By contrast, the National Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System, which has experienced an NM breach, is attempting to 
field capabilities that have never been proven operationally (see Appendix III, Figure 13). 
Breach by Current Value Size of Program  
A similar analysis of current estimates produced similar results.  None of the 20 programs 
valued under $3.5 billion incurred a breach, whereas 18 of the 51 programs valued above 
$3.5 billion did breach.  Because there was only a 0.2% likelihood that the distribution 
was random, one can reject the null hypothesis that breach and program size are 
independent.  A breakdown of the large group into two categories (where 6 of 19 
programs valued between $3.5 billion–$7.95 billion and 12 of the 20 programs valued at 
over $7.95 billion breached) revealed that this distribution has a likelihood of 0.4%.  One 
skeptical interpretation would be that the information inaccurately conveys a correlation 
between low program value and no breach because programs that did encounter high 
unit-cost-growth would likely move into a higher program cost category.  The programs 
valued at $3.5 billion or less, however, only shrank from 23 programs to 20 programs 
(albeit two breaching programs did change categories).  That view is more valid at the 
highest value category, which appears to have picked up a number of programs that 
experienced high unit-cost-growth (this category expanded from 7 to 12 programs).  
Overall, it appears that the interpretation from the last assessment—smaller programs 
may have characteristics that lead their programs to breach less often—remains valid (see 
Appendix III, Figure 14.). 
Breach by (a) Average and (b) Median Cost of Program  
An analysis of breach against the (a) average cost of a project ($13.7 billion) and (b) the 
median cost of the project ($5.4 billion)11 revealed surprising results.  Of the programs 
below the average cost, 14 out of 58 breached (24%), whereas 4 out of 13 above the 
                                                 
11 Because the average cost exceeds the median cost, the data has a rightward skew. 
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average cost breached (31%).  For the median, 6 out of 36 programs below the median 
cost breached (17%), while 12 out of 35 programs with values above the median cost 
breached (34%).  Although a higher proportion of programs above the average and 
median values breached, the results were not statistically significant.  These results were 
unexpected because the previous analysis showed a relationship between breach and the 
value size of a project.  The simplest explanation is that the sample size was too small to 
prove statistical significance.  One interpretation of the data could be that, on average, 
programs that breach have a high monetary value, but the largest programs do not breach 
because their initial values are large enough to preclude generating the unit-cost-growth 
necessary to breach (which would need to be, at the minimum, in the tens of billions of 
dollars; see Appendix III, Figure 15). 
Breach by Program Cost-growth Category  
The SAR Summary Tables list seven categories of cost-growth: economic, quantity, 
schedule, engineering, estimating, other, and support.  Each cost category is meant to 
quantify different reasons for a change in the cost of a program over time.  The economic 
category calculates inflation over time; the quantity category captures cost changes due to 
planned procurement of a different number of items; the schedule category assesses the 
impact of changes in the development timeline to cost; the engineering category evaluates 
changes due to modifications to the physical, or software, makeup of the product; the 
estimating category refers to updating prior assumptions about project or technological 
development; the support category refers to changes in costs not associated with the 
direct production of the item itself, but that are necessary to its functioning (such as spare 
parts or training); and the other category refers to all other items not addressed elsewhere, 
which requires approval by the Secretary of Defense, and includes events such as natural 
disasters (Harrison, 2007).  However, as noted by a number of reports, "while there are 
guidelines on how to allocate cost-growth to these categories, the actual allocation is 
determined by each program” (Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006).  For 
example, if a program experiences technical difficulties that delay its deployment, then 
one program manager might allocate the cost to the estimating category; a different 
program manager might categorize the change under the schedule category; and a third 
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program manager might assign it to engineering.  Overall, different reporting standards 
have lead to inconsistencies across the data profile, reducing the usefulness and accuracy 
of SAR data. 
Two categories were excluded from our data analysis: economic and other.  The 
economic category only accounts for changes in inflation, which should only have a 
strong correlation with the length of time a program has been in development.  The other 
category was excluded because it is rarely used (only 5 programs from the data set 
recorded a non-zero number).   
Programs were tabulated for each cost-change category depending on whether costs for 
the said category had increased, decreased, or remained unchanged during the 
development period of the project.  Only the estimating cost category did not include a 
cost unchanged category because every program experienced a change in that cost 
category. 
All tests for independence between breach and each cost category were statistically 
significant.  As expected, each of the cost categories was correlated with unit-cost 
breach—cost-growth is necessary for an NM breach to occur.  Given that each cost 
category was correlated with breach, cost categories appear heavily interrelated.  From 
this, one can infer that programs that breach exhibit a relatively consistent pattern of 
characteristics.    
As one would expect, positive cost-growth in the estimating category was correlated with 
breaching.  Based on changes in program estimates, only 1 out of 26 that had negative 
estimating-related cost-growth breached, while 17 of 45 that had positive estimating-
related cost-growth breached.  The simplest interpretation is that programs that increase 
estimating costs are much more likely to breach than are programs that do not have to 
increase estimating costs.  Because the estimating-related category should only include 
changes due to initial estimating errors, the conclusion appears to be that in order to avoid 
development difficulties, programs should have sound initial estimates, which would 
minimize positive growth from estimates. 
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Our analysis of the quantity category produced unclear results.  The data revealed that 11 
out of 23 programs with negative quantity-related cost-growth breached, while 3 out of 
23 with no quantity-related cost-growth breached, and 4 out of 25 with positive quantity-
related cost-growth breached.  One interpretation, as noted above, is that the correlation 
observed is likely to be the effect rather than the cause: significant positive quantity-
related cost-growth leads programs to reduce cost, which often means reducing the 
amount of items procured.  Another interpretation is that the NM requirement is biased 
against small-quantity programs because the quantity-adjustment calculation cannot fully 
compensate for a small-quantity program.  
Data regarding the engineering category is similar to the data from the quantity category.    
Five out of 8 programs with negative engineering-related cost-growth breached; 3 out of 
20 programs with no engineering-related cost-growth breached; and 10 out of 33 
programs with positive engineering-related cost-growth breached.  Although programs 
with negative and positive cost-growth are more likely to breach than programs with no 
cost-growth, the interpretation for why the positive and negative cost-growth groups are 
more likely to experience breach probably differs substantially.  Programs with negative 
cost-growth are likely an effect of other cost-growth—put another way, a program likely 
experienced cost-growth resulting in an NM breach, and then reduced capabilities to 
reduce overall cost.  In contrast, programs with positive engineering-related cost-growth 
that breach are more likely to be the cause of cost-growth—new capabilities were added 
to a project that have resulted in higher-than-expected cost-growth.  This later 
explanation is often described as “requirements creep.”   
For the schedule category, 5 out of 14 programs with negative schedule-related cost-
growth breached; 0 of 19 projects with no schedule-related cost-growth breached; and 13 
out of 38 systems with positive schedule-related cost-growth breached.  It appears that 
programs that change schedule are more likely to breach than programs that do not 
change schedule.  It is unlikely, however, that programs with positive schedule-related 
cost-growth breached for the same reasons that programs with negative schedule-related 
cost-growth breached.  The first group of programs was likely to experience an NM 
breach because programs fall behind schedule, leading to the incursion of substantial 
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costs for the delay, such as additional pay to employees.  Conversely, the second group of 
programs is likely to breach because the development schedule is accelerated—forcing 
the program to accept additional risk in order to make quicker deadlines.  An alternative 
explanation would simply be that the correlation between schedule and breach may only 
indicate a correlation between length of program and likelihood of breach—programs 
that breach likely faced development difficulties, necessitating a change in schedule.  
Data for the support category was skewed towards positive growth.  While only 2 out of 
21 programs with negative support-related cost-growth and 3 out of 15 with no support-
related cost-growth breached, 13 out of 35 with positive cost-growth breached.  A 
straightforward interpretation is that programs have been poor at estimating the true 
support costs they require.  Another explanation is that this category is of limited 
usefulness because the definition of support costs often changes over the course of a 
project.  For example, some items not included in initial estimates—such as ammunition 
for a weapon—may be included in the support category estimate only at a late 
development point, driving the unit-cost of the program up even if the program has not 
experienced development difficulties (see Appendix III, Figure 16). 
Breach by Largest Program Cost-growth Category  
A final analysis involved tabulating breach by the program’s largest SAR cost category.  
The largest SAR cost category was calculated in two separate ways: (a) overall cost-
growth, in which a program’s largest SAR cost category was determined by the SAR cost 
category with the largest percentage of cost change that was positive; and (b) absolute 
cost change, in which a program’s largest SAR cost category was determined by the SAR 
cost category with the largest percentage of cost change, regardless of sign.  This method 
of calculation means that a program that is classified as the largest in one cost category 
for overall cost-growth may be categorized differently when measured by absolute cost-
growth.  For example, the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) 
was classified in the engineering category for overall cost-growth (6.60%) but was 
classified in the quantity category for absolute cost change (-8.10%).  
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In both contingency tables the three largest categories, which comprised the vast majority 
of programs, were estimating (25 overall, 34 absolute), quantity (19 overall, 22 absolute), 
and then engineering (17 overall, 10 absolute).  The estimating-related cost-growth 
category accounted for 35% of the programs in the largest cost category and 48% of the 
programs in the largest absolute cost category.  Moreover, the estimating and quantity 
categories combined accounted for 67% and 72% of the programs that breached for the 
respective groups.  A Fisher’s exact test analysis comparing the categories to breach 
shows that there is only a 0.1% chance that the largest cost category results were due to 
chance and only a 0.2% likelihood that the largest absolute cost category was due to 
chance.  The implication from this analysis is that the estimating category appears to be 
the most important factor in determining which programs are likely to breach—not only 
because of its own importance, but as noted above, the quantity cost category is likely to 
reflect an effect of unit-cost-growth rather than a cause (see Appendix III, Figure 17).   
Second Set 
The second set analyzes the same dataset as was used in the first analysis, but codes 31 
programs as having experienced high unit-cost-growth at some point in development.  
More specifically, this analysis considers programs to have experienced high unit-cost-
growth if (a) the program has incurred an NM breach (18 programs) or (b) the program 
would have incurred an NM breach in 2005 if the program had not been rebaselined to 
avoid this designation (13 programs).   
Breach by Service  
Analysis of breach by Service using the broader definition of breach shows that the Navy 
was, again, below average, whereas the Air Force and the DoD experienced average 
results.  Most noticeably, the Army moved from average to the most above average (58% 
of programs breached).  The indication remains that differences exist in project outcomes, 
with Navy programs continuing to experience less unit-cost-growth than the other 
Services.  The other inference from the information is that programs that avoided an NM 
breach were not evenly distributed throughout the Services.  For instance, 4 programs out 
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of the Army’s 9 MDAPs avoided an NM breach, whereas the DoD experienced no 
change in its reporting (see Appendix III, Figure 18). 
Breach by Quantity Change  
Analysis of breach by quantity reaffirms the trends seen in the smaller sample.  When 
broken down by two categories, 54% of programs that changed quantity breached, 
whereas only 24% of programs with no quantity change breached.  A full 81% of 
programs that breached experienced a change in quantity.  Results become more 
distinguished when utilizing three quantity change categories.  76% of programs that 
decreased quantity breached, compared to 48% that breached in the smaller set.  
Together, these breaches represent 61% of all breaches.  The quantity-decrease category 
continues to represent the largest number and highest rate of breach.  The inference from 
this information is that quantity decrease is an important characteristic of programs that 
breach.  Logically, this outcome makes most sense if a program reduces procurement 
levels in order to compensate for budget cuts, cost-growth, or other development 
difficulties (see Appendix III, Figure 19). 
Breach by Baseline Value Size of Program  
This analysis reinforced the finding from the first set of data that larger programs appear 
more likely to breach.  Eleven of the 13 (85%) rebaselined programs not previously 
examined were larger than $3.5 billion, with 7 from the largest-size category.  When 
included in the analysis, those programs over $3.5 billion in value breached 56% of the 
time, compared to 33% of the group that breached in the first sample.  Rebaselining—
whether intentional or not—prevented many high-value programs from technically 
breaching.  This information reinforces the first set’s conclusion that large projects 
appear to be more likely to face development difficulties (see Appendix III, Figure 20). 
Breach by Current Value Size of Program 
The results of this Fisher’s exact test mirror the outcome of the analysis of the breach by 
baseline value size of program.  Programs valued over $7.95 billion breached 38% in the 
first set, a ratio that increased to 69% in the second set.  Contrary to prior analysis, 
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however, 3 programs below $3.5 billion breached.  Surprisingly, no programs between 
the values of $3.5 billion and $7.95 billion were rebaselined.  The general interpretation 
is, again, the large programs are much more likely to breach than other programs.  This 
interpretation is reinforced by the fact that relatively few programs changed categories, 
and hence the majority of large programs that breached were initially large (see Appendix 
III, Figure 21). 
Breach by (a) Average and (b) Median Cost of Program 
As with the prior analyses, the number of programs that breach and that are above the 
average or median values of the sample increased significantly once the rebaselined 
programs were included in the data as breached.  Those programs above the average 
value breached 69% of the time, compared to only 31% in the initial set.  Although this 
p-value was not statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, it was at the 10% 
confidence level.  Similarly, programs above the median value breached 63% of the time, 
compared to only 35% in the first set.  Inclusion of the rebaselined programs is consistent 
with the observation that rebaselined programs tended to be of higher value than the non-
breach programs.  Moreover, inclusion of these programs explains the apparent anomaly 
in the data from analysis of the first set: when all information is included, there is a strong 
relationship between size of program and likelihood of breach (see Appendix III, Figure 
22). 
Breach by Program Cost-growth Category  
Trends in the first set of cost-growth categories are reinforced once the rebaselined 
programs are included.  For the estimating-related cost category, 27 out of the 31 (87%) 
programs that breached experienced positive cost-growth.  Out of all programs that had 
positive cost-growth from this category, 60% breached.  For the quantity-related cost 
category, the most important demarcation was negative cost-growth.  Of the programs 
that recorded negative cost-growth, 78% also had an NM breach, up from 48% from the 
first set.  The engineering, schedule, and support categories each showed stronger 
correlations between positive cost-growth and breach.  When compared to positive cost-
growth from the first set, each cost category increased at least 25 percentage points.  
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While not surprising, those with positive cost-growth (negative in the case of the quantity 
category) were more likely to breach than were programs that did not have positive cost-
growth.  The important finding of this analysis, however, may be that all cost-growth 
categories analyzed were statistically significant.  This high correlation between breach 
and cost-growth categories implies either (a) systemic development problems in the 
acquisition system—programs that breach are different from programs that do not for 
numerous reasons—or (b) there is so much correlation between variables that the SAR 
does not provide useful information for uncovering the root cause of unit-cost-growth 
(see Appendix III, Figure 23). 
Breach by Largest Program Cost-growth Category  
The final analysis involved tabulating breach by the largest program cost category, in 
both overall and absolute terms.  As found above, the estimating and quantity change 
categories are the two most important categories related to cost-growth.  Given prior 
inferences regarding quantity—namely that the correlation between breach and the 
quantity category’s negative cost-growth is likely an effect rather than a cause—
estimating appears to be the most important cost category and deserves intense scrutiny 
(see Appendix III, Figure 24). 
Data Analysis Conclusion 
This analysis arrived at two conclusions.  First, understanding the limits of the analysis, 
the authors have sought to interpret the information available.  The most definitive 
statement that can be made is that programs that experience high unit-cost-growth do not 
appear to be randomly distributed.  Going further, programs that breach appear to have 
the strongest relationship with three factors: the total dollar size of a project, the quantity 
change cost category, and the estimating cost changes.  Programs appear much more 
likely to breach if the program has a high value (above $7.95 billion), positive estimating-
related cost increases, or a change in procurement quantity.  Conversely, programs with 
low value (below $3.5 billion), negative estimating-related cost-growth, or no quantity 
change appear to rarely breach.  Second, the limited amount of publicly available data has 
precluded extensive statistical analysis.  Much of the data collected now does not help 
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decision-makers determine why a breach or unit-cost-growth has occurred or what 
programmatic changes would improve performance.  Although this analysis tested every 
metric provided by the SAR Summary Table (and most were found to be statistically 
significant), the information has not furnished the readers with much greater insight.  The 
available information makes it difficult to assert any conclusions definitively because all 
factors appear interrelated, which means that an unconsidered exogenous variable may be 
confounding all conclusions.   
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V. Case Studies 
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)–High 
The Air Force’s Space-Based Infrared System–High (SBRIS–High) is currently a $12 
billion satellite program to detect and track missiles launched from foreign territory.  
SBIRS–High was originally designed to perform four missions: “missile warning, missile 
defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization (observing and reporting 
on military activities on a battlefield)” (Smith, 2006).  SBIRS–High is one part of the 
system-of-systems Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which is one portion of the 
Missile Defense Agency’s multilayered anti-ballistic missile defense system.   
 




A Lockheed Martin–Northrop Grumman team was awarded the original contract for the 
entire SBIRS project in 1996, a contract valued at $2.16 billion (Smith, 2006).  In 2001, 
the SBIRS–Low portion was transferred from the Air Force to the Missile Defense 
Agency, and in 2002, SBIRS–Low was renamed the Space Tracking and Surveillance 
System.  As of 2009, the SBIRS–High program has spent $9.56 billion (in 1996 dollars); 
Lockheed Martin expects the first satellite to deploy at the beginning of fiscal year 2011 
(Lockheed Martin, 2009).   
History 
SBIRS was designed to replace the current early-warning system known as the Defense 
Support Program (DSP).  DSP was originally designed in the 1950s, and it has been in 
continuous service since the launch of the first satellite in 1970.  According to one report, 
prior to SBIRS, “none of the proposed replacement programs—the Advanced Warning 
System in the early 1980s, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System in the late 1980s, 
the Follow-on Early Warning System in the early 1990s, and the Alert, Locate and Report 
Missiles System in the mid-1990s—reached fruition” (Smith, 2006).  In order to fulfill 
required capabilities in the meantime, the Air Force incrementally improved the existing 
DSP.  Acknowledging that marginal improvements of the legacy system would not fulfill 
future requirements, the Air Force authorized another replacement program, SBIRS.  
The SBIRS program has continually faced significant development difficulties.  As stated 
bluntly by the GAO, “since its inception, SBIRS has been burdened by underestimated 
software and technical complexities, poor oversight, and other problems that have 
resulted in cost overruns and years in schedule delays” (Chaplain, 2007).  In 2001, 
SBIRS incurred a critical NM breach because a preliminary cost analysis projected cost-
growth in excess of $2 billion—approximately a 70% increase in unit-cost (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003).  Congress certified SBIRS, and the program was 
restructured in 2002.  Under its new plan, the program’s budget increased to $4.4 billion 
and its deployment was delayed from 2002 to 2004.  Despite its recent restructuring, the 
GAO noted “it has become increasingly evident that the underlying factors that led to the 
Nunn-McCurdy breach—particularly the lack of critical knowledge—continue to cause 
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problems, and additional cost and schedule slips beyond the revised acquisition program 
baseline appear inevitable” (Government Accountability Office, 2003).  As predicted, 
development problems persisted.  In 2005, SBIRS was one of the programs experiencing 
unit-cost-growth in excess of 50% of its current baseline, and, as a result, the DoD 
rebaselined the program before the 2006 revision of the Nunn–McCurdy amendment took 
effect.   
Alternative Infrared Satellite System 
In 2005, the DoD instructed the Air Force to develop an alternative to SBIRS–High 
following the program’s restructuring to avoid an NM breach.  Full development of the 
program, known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), began in 2006.  
AIRSS was principally designed to compete with SBIRS–High to ensure that the United 
States maintained a vital missile warning capability if the SBIRS–High program faced 
more setbacks.  AIRSS was also designed, however, to potentially provide more 
advanced capabilities than SBIRS–High, if the rescheduled SBIRS–High program 
appeared to be on a sustainable development track.  The GAO noted the apparent 
incompatibility between these two goals (i.e., the short development timeframe and the 
higher performance) and further asserted that it “became evident that AIRSS could not 
realistically serve as a back-up to SBIRS(–High) because the proposed satellite delivery 
schedule is very aggressive for meeting the 2015 launch availability date, according to 
AIRSS program officials” (Chaplain, 2007).  This development path is particularly 
concerning because SBIRS–High has continued to face difficulties, leaving the military 
without the option to quickly replace its aging satellites in service, if they were to fail.   
Recent SBIRS–High Progress 
In January 2007, the program experienced another major setback when the flight software 
for the first satellite failed testing.  This setback was expected to delay the program by 15 
months and cost $414 million.  The GAO, however, judged that neither its own internal 
assessment “nor the independent reviewers who examined the redesign approach 
indicated that the current goals were executable,” because expectations were too 
optimistic (Government Accountability Office, 2008).  The GAO’s most recent 
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assessment of the program noted that problems continue, as only “two of the SBIRS High 
program’s three critical technologies are mature—a lower level of maturity than last 
year” (Government Accountability Office, 2009).  At present, Lockheed Martin expects 
the first satellite to deploy at the beginning of fiscal year 2011 (Lockheed Martin, 2009).   
Lesson Learned 
The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)–High program highlights how the threat of an 
NM breach does not necessarily lead to improved acquisition outcomes because many 
programs that incur an NM breach continue to face acquisition difficulties throughout 
their development cycle.  Although many programs must be restructured, in most cases 
they cannot be established upon a sustainable development path.  Problems that plague 
programs at initiation, such as optimistic expectations using immature technologies, are 
difficult to fix once the program is midway through its development.  Although NM may 
be effective at alerting Congress of problems in system development, it is unlikely to 
provide Congress an effective opportunity to prevent or avoid the majority of unit-cost-
growth without broader reform.  
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Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN-774) 
The Virginia-class submarine is the Navy’s newest class of attack submarine.  The Navy 
initiated development of this craft in 1993 to replace attack submarines designed during 
the Cold War.  The goal of the program was to produce a ship that was low cost and 
highly versatile.  The submarine program experienced unit-cost-growth issues that 
culminated in a significant Nunn–McCurdy breach in December 2005.  Since that point 
in time, the Navy has made a concerted effort to reduce costs.  As of late 2009, the Navy 
has been at least partially successful in reducing the costs of this project, although the full 
impact of recent policy changes will take a few years to determine.  
 
Figure 8: SSN-774 
Source: (Northrop Grumman, n.d.) 
Description 
The Virginia-class submarine is the Navy’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine.  
The submarine is also known as the SSN-774 class.12  The submarine was initially 
designed to be “a cheaper alternative to the Cold War era Seawolf-class [and older Los 
                                                 
12. SS denotes the ship as a submarine, while N is the classification for nuclear powered. 
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Angeles-class] attack submarines” (U.S. Navy Commander of Naval Submarine Forces, 
2009).   
Reflecting the DoD’s post-Cold War assessment of military threats, the SSN-774 is 
designed to be flexible and to fulfill a versatile mission portfolio.  Its missions include 
combat operations against enemy submarines and surface ships, precision sea-to-air strike 
capability (available due to use of Tomahawk cruise missiles), enhanced surveillance 
missions, and special operations support.  The craft is design to engage enemies in both 
blue-water and littoral environments (Government Accountability Office 2009).  To 
handle its various missions, the submarine is equipped with 12 vertical-launch system 
tubes, which fire Tomahawk missiles, and 4 torpedo tubes (Commander of Naval 
Submarine Forces U.S. Navy 2009).   
The submarine class will gradually be equipped with three new, major submarine 
innovations: “advanced electromagnetic signature reduction, a flexible payload sail, and a 
conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array” (Government Accountability 
Office 2009).  A Virginia-class submarine is able to reduce its signature significantly 
through the use of advanced software algorithms that automatically adjust to minimize 
signals that would alert sensors to the presence of the submarine, thus making the ship 
stealthier.  The sail has a flexible payload that can house different payloads or systems, 
depending on the requirements of the mission.  This area is now available for 
reconfiguration because the mast is fully electronic.  Finally, the conformal, acoustic 
velocity sensor-wide aperture array is a sensor array that surrounds the submarine, giving 
it vastly improved sonar perception around the entire ship (Government Accountability 
Office 2009).  The Virginia-class has also been designed (utilizing an “open 
architecture”) to allow for the rapid insertion of new technologies as they become 
available.   
An additional goal of the Virginia-class design is to significantly decrease lifecycle costs 
when compared to past submarines.  Because the most important contributor to lifecycle 
costs is the crew, the Navy has sought to reduce the number of crew required to serve on 
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the ship through greater automation of ship functions (Government Accountability 
Office, 2006).   
Other Acquisition Conditions 
The Navy’s design for the Virginia-class submarine took into consideration concerns 
other than the performance of the vehicle.  Three other objectives of the program were to 
(1) sustain the submarine attack fleet at approximately 55 ships (revised in 2006 to about 
50 ships), (2) maintain the strategic capability of two shipyard facilities capable of 
producing nuclear submarines (General Dynamics’ Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, 
Connecticut, and Northrop Grumman’s Newport News shipyard in Newport News, 
Virginia), and (3) acquire the system at low cost.  In order to fulfill this last objective, the 
Navy needed to implement an effective acquisition plan to avoid the historically high-
cost-growth associated with the lead ship of a new class. 
As noted by the GAO, “there is tension inherent among the multiple objectives of the 
plan” (Government Accountability Office 2006).  Maintaining two shipyards capable of 
building nuclear-powered submarines with a low annual build rate is not cost effective in 
the short run (Ronald O’Rourke 2004).  While the two shipyards may exert enough 
competition to reduce Navy nuclear-submarine acquisition costs in the long term, the 
Navy must pay a high upfront price to keep open an option that may not yield predicted 
returns (especially if the current program does not compete them).   
Initial Development 
The government initiated what would become the Virginia-class submarine development 
in 1991, with the explicit goal of producing a more versatile but less costly submarine 
than the most recently developed Cold War submarine, the Seawolf-class.  In early 1996, 
the Navy awarded a sole-source contract to Electric Boat for development of the detail 
design of the SSN-774 program.  This agreement was unusual because the Navy often 
bundles detail design with a commitment to construction, which commits the government 
to future procurement very early in the development process (Government Accountability 
Office 2005).   
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By the end of 1996, however, Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding—the 
owners of the only two U.S. shipyards capable of building nuclear-powered 
submarines—“proposed to construct [the submarines] as a team, rather than as 
competitors” (Federation of American Scientists).  Although the Navy estimated in a 
1997 study that the joint-production arrangement would increase the cost of each 
submarine from about $1.55 billion to $1.65 billion in FY1995 dollars (plus or minus $50 
million, depending on the number of submarines procured), this arrangement allowed 
both shipyards to remain active, in accordance with Congressional wishes (O’Rourke, 
2004).  In 1998, the Navy awarded the partnership a $4.2 billion contract for the 
construction of the first four ships of the Virginia-class submarine (Commander of Naval 
Submarine Forces U.S. Navy 2009).   
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
The Virginia-class submarine was the first submarine designed by the Navy that used a 
new design process known as integrated product and process development (IPPD).  The 
purpose of the process is to “reduce cost by streamlining the design and construction 
process” (John F. Schank, Mark V. Arena, Paul DeLuca, Jessie Riposo, Kimberly Curry, 
Todd Weeks, and James Chiesa. 2007).  IPPD achieves this goal by undertaking the 
processes of the traditional design process concurrently.  The process relies upon an 
integrated team that has participating members from all important constituents – 
designers, construction personnel, and the Navy – throughout the entire acquisition 
process.  If implemented correctly, IPPD can result in more rapid design with fewer 
required changes than the traditional design process – as the SSN-774 program achieved 
in its design phase (Schank, Arena, DeLuca, Riposo, Curry, Weeks, & Chiesa, 2007).   
Initial Construction Contract 
The initial two-shipyard contract was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for four submarines, 
awarded in 1998.  Due to significant risks in material costs, the contract included 
provisions to procure such materials as a special line item, with a separate cost-plus-
fixed-fee agreement (Government Accountability Office, 2005).   
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The SSN-774 contract was unique because, for the first time, the Navy authorized two 
shipyards to construct a single nuclear submarine.  Under the agreement, each shipyard is 
designated specific portions of the submarine to build.  The shipyards then alternate 
responsibility for (1) building the reactor components of the submarine and (2) 
undertaking final assembly of the craft.  Overall, the profits of the venture are to be split 
evenly between the two firms (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 
Affairs) U.S. Department of Defense 2003). 
Contracts for the first ship of a class are typically structured as cost-plus.  As noted by the 
GAO, the Navy tends to procure ships in this manner “because these ships tend to involve 
a high-level of uncertainty and, thus, high cost risks” (Government Accountability Office 
2005).  Historically, ship designs change substantially between the end of the design 
phase and the service of the first ship.  Changes occur for a variety of reasons, including 
construction issues and the Navy’s assessment of the performance of the ship during sea 
trials.  Once a ship’s design has stabilized, the Navy typically writes a fixed-price 
contract agreement.  
First Development Group 
In 1998, the construction of the lead ship, SSN-774, began at the Electric Boat shipyard.  
Construction of the second ship, the first produced at the Newport News shipyard, began 
in 1999.  Escalating costs lead the Navy to request additional funds to complete the ships.  
By early 2003, the program was experiencing unit-cost overruns of 24%, prompting the 
program office to revise the baseline estimate in April 2003, avoiding a Nunn–McCurdy 
breach (Francis, 2003). 
Second Construction Contract  
Despite program difficulties, the Navy awarded the contractors with a multiyear contract 
for six additional submarines in August 2003.   
Multiyear procurement authority allows the Navy to contract for purchases that will occur 
in future fiscal years.  This contracting method allows for more efficient acquisition than 
can be achieved by renewing annual contracts because it allows contractors to plan ahead 
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and acquire resources in a more economical manner.  Although more economically 
efficient, Congress does not typically authorize such transactions because (1) such 
agreements mean that the present Congress obligates future Congresses to spend funds 
and (2) if a program is risky, this agreement commits the government to a costly long-
term development process or requires the government to pay a substantial financial 
penalty to cancel the program (Francis, 2003).  The Navy has estimated that multiyear 
contracting would save an average of $155 million per submarine (U.S. Department of 
Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 2003). 
The second contract has a relatively simple incentive structure.  As noted by John J. 
Young, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition, "the contract … increases industry's profitability [if they come in] below the 
target price, incentivizing them to control and under run the target. It shares the cost 
above the target, with industry taking a greater share of those costs [than] in many of our 
other shipbuilding contracts, thereby discouraging overruns to costs" (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs] U.S. Department of Defense 2003).  More 
specifically, the contract had a 12.5% profit for the first submarine and 12% for the other 
SSN-774s.  If the contractor kept costs below 95% of the intended unit-cost goal, industry 
would keep 90% of the savings.  Between 95–100% of the unit-cost target, the firms 
would keep 70% of the savings.  If costs came in over the unit-cost target, however, the 
firms would be docked a percentage of their fee.  For example, if costs exceeded 104% of 
the target unit-cost, then the firm would have to pay 55% of the cost overrun (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs] U.S. Department of Defense 2003).   
Development Difficulties 
Despite rising unit-cost-growth, SSN-774 was delivered in October 2004, only four 
months behind schedule.  At the same time, SSN 775 faced unit-cost-growth in excess of 
that experienced by the SSN-774.  One of the principle reasons for this growth was that 
SSN 775—the lead ship at the Newport News shipyard—was contracted at a price that 
reflected a follow-on ship order.  Thus, the SSN 775 was expected to reflect the benefits 
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of a shipyard moving down the learning curve, even though the Newport News shipyard 
did not have prior Virginia-class construction experience.   
The Virginia-class submarine program experienced a significant NM breach in December 
2005.  At that time, the program had unit-cost-growth of 34.8% over its original baseline 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Resources and Analysis), 2006).   
Subsequent government reports highlighted some of the reasons for the unit-cost-growth 
of the program.  The primary cause of cost-growth was the low estimate for material and 
labor-hour costs that would be required to complete the two submarines under 
construction, the SSN-774 and SSN 775.  The average source of cost-growth is shown in 




Figure 9: Average sources of cost-growth for Virginia-class submarines 
Source: (Government Accountability Office 2005) 
Several factors contributed to the low cost estimates.  Initial estimates were 
unrealistically low because the Navy used optimistic design and technology assumptions 
in constructing its risk assessment of the program.  Moreover, the program lacked a 
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complete cost analysis.  For instance, the cost analysis used the acquisition environment 
of the 1980s as the baseline for the analysis, even though such conditions had changed 
significantly by the late 1990s.  Furthermore, the cost analysis lacked an independent 
assessment, or a confidence estimate.  Finally, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 
contributed to the difficulties faced by the program because the firms agreed to “design 
and construct these ships for $748 million less than their estimated costs because the 
contract protected their financial risk” (Government Accountability Office 2005).  By 
accepting the vast majority of the financial risk associated with cost-growth, as well as by 
providing the contractors with a large fee for their services, the Navy presented the 
contractors with a low-risk, but high-payoff opportunity.  By contracting in this way, the 
Navy did not fully uphold its responsibility to properly estimate the program’s cost and, 
as a result, enhanced the program’s risk of failure. 
Other factors posed obstacles to improving acquisition performance once development 
started.  First, “about 80% of the total material procured from supplier firms for the 
construction of submarines (measured in dollars…) [came] from single or sole source 
suppliers” (O’Rourke, 2009).  Purchasing from a single buyer typically occurred because 
only one supplier operated in a given niche market.  Second, the Navy receives 
information on the program only once a quarter, delaying identification of problems and 
implementation of solutions.  Third, the information the Navy collects is not sufficient to 
determine the real causes of cost-growth.  This limited visibility makes it difficult to 
develop and implement effective solutions.   
Program Development to Present 
The Navy has grown increasingly concerned about the high unit-cost-growth of the 
Virginia-class submarine, prompting efforts to reduce the cost of the program in 2004.  
The specific goal of the present cost-reduction plan is to trim the cost of every submarine 
by $400 million dollars, from approximately $2.4 billion to $2.0 billion (in 2005 dollars) 
(Shalal-Esa, 2008).  Achieving this goal is vital because without additional funding, the 
Navy will have to reduce planned procurement of the SSN-774 class.   
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To date, the Navy and contractor shipyards have realized some of the Navy’s planned 
cost-reductions.  Some of these cost-reductions would likely have occurred without 
additional Navy actions.  For example, the contractors have now begun construction of 
follow-on ships, which have historically experienced lower cost-growth than lead ships.  
The shipyards have moved down the learning curve and have avoided problems that 
caused significant cost-growth in the construction of the lead ship.  This greater 
knowledge has also produced other benefits, such as more effective use of multiyear 
contracting.  Other cost savings have been generated through more direct action, mostly 
in design changes to reduce the acquisition cost of the submarine.  The most important 
change was the decision to build the submarine in four sections, compared to the initial 
construction in ten sections.  This change significantly reduced the time needed to build 
the submarine, which, in turn, substantially reduced labor costs.  Other examples of cost 
savings can be found in the modification of the spherical sonar array and in the 
simplification of the vertical-launch missile tubes.  Overall, the Navy expects to achieve a 
cost-reduction of approximately $200 million per ship—due to improved economies of 
scale—and the other $200 million from changes to the ship’s design or shipyard 
production process (O’Rourke, 2009).   
The Navy’s cost savings plan has already achieved some results.  In June 2008, the Navy 
christened the New Hampshire, which was “delivered eight months ahead of schedule 
and $54 million under budget” (Associated Press, 2008).  One month earlier, Admiral 
Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, stated the following in Congressional 
testimony:  “I consider Virginia Class cost-reduction efforts a model for all our ships, 
submarines, and aircraft” (Roughhead, 2009). 
Partially due to the success of the New Hampshire, the Navy authorized the third contract 
for Virginia-class submarine construction in December 2008.  This fixed-price, multiyear 
contract for eight submarines was valued at $14 billion.  For the first time, the program 
contracted to build two submarines a year—one at each participating shipyard—starting 
in fiscal year 2011 (O’Rourke, 2009).   
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Most recently, Navy officials stated that the program has “reduced costs by more than 
$172 million per ship through design changes and construction time reductions," which 
the GAO believes places the program on track to achieve its goals (Government 
Accountability Office, 2009).  It will be difficult to assess the validity of these estimates, 
however, until the submarines have entered service.   
Lessons Learned 
The Virginia-class submarine case study highlights how a program that has incurred an 
NM breach can implement policies to improve acquisition outcomes.  The authors 
determined several lessons learned from this case study. 
The Nunn–McCurdy breach did not appear to be an important factor in provoking the 
Navy to implement cost-savings changes to the Virginia-class program.  The Navy's first 
cost-reduction efforts took place prior to the program's Nunn–McCurdy breach.  While 
the Nunn–McCurdy unit-cost breach may have highlighted the need for, or the extent of, 
the eventual cost-reduction plan, it is difficult to determine the impact of the breach on 
the cost-reduction effort because few reports reference the unit-cost breach in relation to 
the cost-reduction effort.  Although anecdotal, most reports on the matter highlight the 
Navy's fear that high unit-cost would reduce the number of submarines that could be 
acquired.  Some reports went as far as to link the Navy’s cost-reduction objective—
achieving a unit-cost of $2 billion—with the maximum unit-cost level that would allow 
the Navy to procure two submarines a year.  Ultimately, it is difficult to determine which 
events triggered programmatic changes that have reduced acquisition and unit-costs, but 
it does not appear that the NM breach was a principle instigator.   
A proper business plan should include an independent cost analysis and use confidence 
levels to determine certainty.  An independent cost analysis would provide an objective 
assessment of the Navy-contractor estimate, while a confidence level would help define 
the risk associated with the project.  The Navy's development plan for the SSN-774 did 
not include either of these measures.  Congress has since mandated the use of these 
procedures in the Major Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. 
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The Navy should separate contracting for lead ships from contracts for follow-on ships.  
By contracting for follow-on ships at the same time that it contracted for the lead ships, 
the Navy lost the opportunity to incorporate the knowledge gained through initial 
construction for future contract negotiations.  Given that lead-ship construction typically 
incurs high cost-growth, the Navy has extra incentive to avoid committing itself to a 
process or program that might be more costly than it originally projected.  Separating 
construction buys would also give the Navy and contractor additional time to determine 




Unit-cost-growth has remained high since NM was implemented in 1982.  
Based on our analysis of the studies presented above, we have determined that unit-cost-
growth from the 1960s through the 1990s appears to have averaged at least 50% above 
initial cost estimates.  The GAO estimates that the current MDAPs under development 
have experienced, on average, 26% program cost-growth, which will likely grow 
significantly by the time the systems are finally retired in future decades (Sullivan, 2008).  
This program cost-growth is likely to underestimate unit-cost-growth because programs 
typically reduce quantity in order to reign in a project’s overall cost.  Due to high and 
persistent program and unit-cost-growth, it is safe to assume that the acquisition process 
has significant challenges.   
Few programs incurred an NM breach until the recent 2006 revision of the law that 
requires programs to consider unit-cost-growth above the program’s original 
baseline. 
Although unit-cost-growth has been high since the establishment of NM, few programs 
incurred an NM breach until the 2006 revision of the statute required programs to 
consider unit-cost-growth above a program’s original baseline.  At that point, 25 
programs avoided an NM breach by rebaselining (under a “grandfather” clause).  
Although a significant number of programs have now incurred an NM breach (at least 26 
programs), few programs have been cancelled due to NM.13  Moreover, multiple sources 
argue that no programs have been cancelled solely for cost reasons, which may 
undermine the desired effect of NM (Erwin, 2008). 
Data Collection is Inconsistent. 
The DoD does not track acquisition information accurately or consistently across the 
entire department, nor is such information provided in a timely manner.  Definitions and 
                                                 
13 Identifying programs cancelled due to an NM breach is difficult. After searching SAR summary reports 
from 1995–2007, we found that only two program cancellations occurred shortly after an NM breach or 
noted an NM breach as the cause for cancellation. These programs are the Navy Area Terminal Ballistic 
Missile Defense (2001) program and the Navy’s Advanced SEAL Delivery System (2005). 
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baselines typically change multiple times over a program’s development cycle.  Data that 
is reported tends to be of marginal value.  For example, the SAR’s eight high-level 
aggregated categories do not provide oversight officials with the knowledge required to 
make informed program decisions.  Moreover, most reported information is input 
oriented, and, as a result, no linkage exists between data and the performance of a 
program.  The existing data collection and information systems are not consistent with 
the kinds of information systems that world-class commercial firms employ.  
The DoD often has not conducted systematic analysis of root-cause problems.  
At present, the DoD does not systemically analyze its acquisition difficulties.  Each 
program that incurs an NM breach is, in effect, treated as a separate incident that is 
unrelated to other programs that experience development difficulties and NM cost 
breaches.  Given that the system has experienced significant difficulties over a prolonged 
period of time, it appears that systemic problems plague the acquisition system.  Systemic 
problems require a more holistic view of the acquisition process in order to diagnose and 
treat it effectively. 
Limited and inconsistent data undermines an effective analysis.  
The limited available data does not allow for a definitive determination regarding the root 
cause of unit-cost-growth.  Without such information, the DoD has been unable to 
diagnosis, treat, and, ultimately, cure systemic acquisition problems that have symptoms 
such as high cost-growth, schedule delay, and reduced system performance.   
Moreover, as a result of the limited data, no consensus exists regarding the impact of NM 
on unit-cost-growth.  While one report stated that NM appeared to reduce procurement 
unit-cost-growth, other researchers concluded that acquisition reforms as a whole had 
little to no impact on unit-cost-growth.  Given persistently high unit-cost-growth, it is 
unlikely that NM significantly reduced unit-cost-growth. 
Available data only allowed for a limited data analysis.  This analysis revealed that a 
number of simple factors (such as program size or quantity change) appear to be related 
to an NM breach.  Although it appears that projects that incurred an NM breach tend to 
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have similar characteristics, the lack of more useful information precludes an analysis 
that would yield more useful conclusions.   
NM may identify acquisition problems too late in the development process to allow 
program reforms to be effective. 
There are many individuals responsible for the performance of the DoD’s acquisition 
programs, including individual program managers, the applicable program executive 
officer, the USD(AT&L), and, ultimately, the Secretary of Defense.  The people in these 
positions generally have the greatest insight into a program’s status and problems.  
However, since the DoD’s record in controlling cost-growth for major programs has, in 
general, been poor, Congress has taken proactive measures in an effort to control cost-
growth, including legislating the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment.   
But, as currently implemented, NM may report problems to Congress too late to allow a 
program to implement meaningful reform and avoid excessive unit-cost-growth.  
Although NM specifically states that Congress should be notified if a program manager 
believes that acquisition difficulties may occur, often Congress is not informed of a 
program's unit-cost-growth until an NM unit-cost breach is imminent, or has actually 
taken place.  Current practice not only diminishes the ability of Congress to appropriately 
fulfill their oversight role, but also reduces the deterrent effect of NM.  Furthermore, by 
the time a program manger reports that a program is incurring unit-cost-growth great 
enough to warrant an NM breach, the program is likely to be too far along its 
development path to avoid significant problems.  The earlier that senior leaders and 
oversight activities are alerted to a program difficulty projected to significantly impact 
cost, performance, or schedule, the sooner decision-makers can implement necessary 
program changes.   
NM’s effectiveness may be limited by its focus on the development and procurement 
of assets as opposed to the entire lifecycle of the program. 
NM focuses on unit-cost-growth during the RDT&E and production phases of system 
acquisition.  Although these phases represent a significant portion of a system’s ultimate 
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cost—approximately 50%—NM does not cover the operations and support phase that 
represents the other 50% of a typical weapon system’s cost.  Without tracking and 
enforcing lifecycle cost-growth, the DoD cannot properly manage its assets and make 
important long-term strategic tradeoffs.  For example, program managers may reduce 
development cost to avoid an NM breach, but these actions may ultimately significantly 
increase the system lifecycle costs (such as through reduced reliability).  
Recent legislation has not been implemented long enough to evaluate its impact on 
DoD acquisition processes.  
The legislations that took effect in 2006 and 2009 have not yet been in place long enough 
to evaluate their impact.  A proper evaluation will require several years of data in order to 
determine if the legislation had the effect that legislators sought.  Evaluation will be 
especially difficult because most programs have already been in development for an 
extended period of time, and the sample size is small.  A brief qualitative assessment of 
the legislation is that the reforms addressed three major NM loopholes.  First, the 2006 
revision limited the ability of programs to avoid NM breaches through rebaselining—
although the new breach criteria are set rather high.  Second, the 2009 revision expanded 
the use of effective cost-estimating techniques.  More specifically, the statute now 
requires that a program utilize independent cost estimates and estimate the risk of the 
program. 
These techniques should improve the utility of cost estimates by increasing the accuracy 
and verities of such estimates, in turn helping programs to start on a sustainable 
development path.  Finally, the legislation mandates that program managers perform an 
analysis—known as the Performance Assessment & Root Cause Analysis (PARCA)—to 
determine the reasoning behind a program breach.  Congressional intent in directing the 
establishment of this organization was to create a capability to identify and track a series of 
meaningful metrics about performance for DoD MDAP programs.  If effectively 
implemented, PARCA could help the DoD to determine earlier programs that are facing 
problems as well as the factors most likely to cause a program to breach, thus helping to 
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formulate more effective policy in the future.  The long-term impact of this new 
legislation, however, cannot be fully assessed at this time. 
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VII. Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
Recommendations to Improve Nunn–McCurdy 
The DoD should develop a system to determine and distribute lessons learned from 
NM breaches throughout the DoD.  
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 mandates that programs that 
experience an NM breach undergo a Performance Assessment & Root Cause Analysis 
(PARCA) to determine why a unit-cost breach occurred.  The DoD should take this 
policy one step further by mandating that these analyses be utilized to determine lessons 
learned that are applicable to, and distributed throughout, the DoD as a whole.  In this 
way, the DoD can learn from its past mistakes and minimize the potential for similar 
mistakes to be made in the future.  
The DoD Should Develop Leading Indicators. 
The DoD should develop leading indicators to provide greater warning of unit-cost-
growth difficulties.  These measures would allow the DoD to better understand when a 
program has encountered development difficulties, and they would provide decision-
makers—including senior DoD acquisition managers and, if required, Congress—with 
the opportunity to fulfill their oversight obligations.  As a result, the DoD would have 
greater incentive to recognize and remedy development issues at an early stage of 
development, when such decisions can be fixed at the lowest cost. 
The leading indicators should act as an anticipatory warning system.  Like an NM breach, 
unit-cost-growth that exceeds a predetermined threshold should trigger enhanced 
reporting requirements to clarify why a problem has occurred and how the program 
manager plans to rectify the situation.  In this way, program managers can identify 
problems before unit-cost-growth increases to the point at which an NM breach occurs.  
A favorable anticipatory warning threshold would likely be between 5–10% over a 
program's original estimate. 
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Recommendations to Control Unit-cost-growth 
The DoD should fully embrace and implement the Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009 legislation.  
Prior attempts to reform DoD acquisitions have generally been ineffective, in large part 
due to the DoD’s institutional resistance.  The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
of 2009 attempts to address many of the persistent difficulties found within the defense 
acquisition system.  Solutions include promotion of competition throughout the lifecycle, 
greater use of independent cost estimates and confidence intervals, new director positions 
to oversee the acquisition system, and new and more stringent procedures to recertify a 
program that has incurred an NM breach.  This legislation will only be effective, 
however, if the DoD embraces the change.  Prior attempts to reform the DoD have been 
ineffective in large part due to the DoD’s institutional resistance.  The DoD would reap 
significant returns by internalizing recent legislation in order to incrementally improve its 
own operations.  
The DoD should identify cost as a development requirement of equal importance to 
performance and schedule. 
All too often, the DoD sacrifices cost objectives in order to maintain a program’s 
performance or schedule.  Unfortunately, these decisions often do not consider what 
would represent the best-value tradeoff for the DoD.  The DoD’s emphasis on 
performance and, to a lesser degree, schedule persists because the DoD’s culture 
emphasizes first and foremost having the most capable system, with much less 
consideration given to development and procurement costs.  We believe that programs 
should have a unit-cost requirement, equal in priority to performance and schedule, to 
help define the appropriate trade-space for the program office.  This would also promote 
cultural change, creating much greater sensitivity to the importance of program cost. 
The DoD should implement a more complete acquisition-data information system. 
A more comprehensive data information system is needed to provide oversight officials 
with the knowledge required to make effective programmatic decisions.  The system 
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should also make use of performance-based metrics in order to provide a link between 
acquisition progress and results.  To that end, the Selected Acquisition Report system 
must be reformed and updated.  The DoD should initiate this lengthy task by 
commissioning a task force to identify the best way to develop and implement a new 
acquisition reporting information system. 
The DoD should consider lifecycle costs when rendering acquisition decisions.  
At present, DoD program officials typically make decisions based on relatively short-
term time horizons, and they often do not consider the impact of these on the lifecycle of 
the program.  As a result, many of these decisions may be optimal in the short run, or for 
the current program phase, but suboptimal over the program’s lifecycle.   
With the current form of the NM legislation, no consideration is given to a program’s 
lifecycle cost.  One can envision a situation in which development or procurement 
changes that would significantly reduce lifecycle costs are avoided to preclude an NM 
breach.  In order to avoid unnecessary future costs, the DoD should mandate that program 
officials consider the lifecycle impact of alternatives before the decisions are made. 
The DoD should directly address the lack of incentives that allow current 
underlying problems to persist. 
The DoD currently experiences a number of acquisition difficulties that stem largely from 
poor decisions.  Despite ample warning and past experience, the DoD continues to fund 
projects with unreasonable cost and schedule estimates, unrealistic performance 
expectations, and “fixed” requirements (even when a program’s performance is based on 
immature technologies).  These are compounded by external influences, such as 
Congressional decisions to shift funding levels and restrictive oversight requirements.  
Many of the DoD’s acquisition difficulties could be avoided or minimized if DoD 
officials would fully implement current policies and best practices.  
At present, DoD officials have few incentives—and, in some cases, limited authority—to 
ensure that programs are initiated based on realistic cost and schedule estimates.  In order 
to create the desired cultural changes, the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of 
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Defense/USD(AT&L), the Service Secretaries/Military Chiefs, and Defense Agency 
heads must create a new incentive system for leaders, managers, and employees that 
encourages and rewards employees for improving the efficiency of the DoD’s acquisition 
system.  Individual performance awards and promotions should be used to acknowledge 
significant achievements toward reaching acquisition program objectives. 
Congress and the DoD Should Work to Increase Funding Flexibility.  
DoD programs may face programmatic difficulties for a number of different reasons.  
Many small yet unexpected difficulties become significant problems over time as 
program managers do not have the budgetary flexibility required to implement a solution 
quickly.  For example, DoD program managers should be able to use production money 
to increase development costs so as to save far more significant unit production costs, as 
is done in the commercial sector.  Development teams need to be able to take advantage 
of opportunities as they arise or avoid technical difficulties as necessary.  As 
requirements shift, programs need greater latitude to realign funds within the scope of the 
total-program.  We believe the DoD would benefit greatly from enhanced funding 
flexibility—a staple in the commercial sector—in terms of better acquisition outcomes.  
Provide Programs with Greater Requirements Flexibility. 
Users must allow more flexibility with system requirements in order to allow program 
managers to direct programs more effectively.  In many instances, users must be willing 
to accept less capable systems (the “80 percent solution”) earlier, and then evolve to 
desired capability in later blocks.  By accepting less technologically challenging solutions 
in the near term, users allow system developers greater ability to make necessary cost, 
performance, and schedule tradeoffs as they arise (although cost should typically be 
viewed as a design constraint).  For example, a program manager should be allowed to 
make cost/performance tradeoffs, particularly for block I of a deployed system, to ensure 
that the last 5–10% of the performance “requirements” don’t double the unit-costs.  DoD 
programs generally do not demonstrate this adaptability until budget overruns require 




The DoD typically funds a small number of very large defense acquisition projects.  Due 
to their size and importance, each program is deemed to be vitally important to national 
security.  Despite a long history of significant developmental difficulties, defense 
acquisition projects have rarely been cancelled by either the DoD or Congress, both of 
which cite national security concerns.  Moreover, only a small percentage of cancelled 
programs have been cancelled due solely to budgetary concerns.  Consequently, 
programs face few consequences for missing budgetary estimates, undermining the 
effectiveness of NM.   
In a book originally published in 1983, Norman Augustine made the following quip 
based on cost-growth trends: “in the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase 
just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3 ½ days 
each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the 
extra day” (Augustine, 1997).  Sadly, program and unit-cost-growth have not improved 
significantly since the publication of that book.  The DoD has historically compensated 
for program cost-growth through increased budgets (most recently with the sharply 
increased budgets and supplementals supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).  
Based on the current budgetary environment, however, we believe the DoD will soon 
enter an era of constrained budgets.  The DoD’s acquisition process—including its 
oversight procedures—requires reform in order to allow the DoD to provide the nation 




Appendix A: Programs that reported unit-cost-growth and/or 
Nunn–McCurdy breach, 1998-2008 






   
1. AEHF (Advanced Extremely High 
Frequency)  217 218 
2. AGM-88E AARGM (Advanced Anti-
Radiation Guided Missile) 019 0 
3. AIM-9X (Sidewinder) 0 0 
4. AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-
Air Missile) 2 0 
5. ATIRCM/CMWS (Advanced Threat Infrared 
Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System) 1 1 
6. B-2 RMP (Radar Modernization Program) 0 0 
7. BMDS (Ballistic Missile Defense System) 0 0 
8. Bradley Upgrade 2 0 
9. C-130 AMP (Avionics Modernization 
Program) 2 2 
10. C-130J 0 0 
11. C-17A 2 0 
12. C-5 RERP (Reliability Enhancement and 
Re-engining Program) 2 2 
13. CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability) 0 0 
14. CHEM DEMIL-ACWA (Chemical 
Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical 
Weapons Alternatives) 2 2 
15. CHEM DEMIL-CMA (Chemical 
Demilitarization-Chemical Materials Agency) 1 1 
16. COBRA JUDY REPLACEMENT 0 0 
17. CVN 21 0 0 
18. CVN 68 0 0 
                                                 
14 Programs are only listed once, regardless of the number of times a program experienced high unit-cost-
growth or an NM breach. This table conveys the most recently reported infraction by a program. 
15 A program is noted as having high unit-cost-growth if a SAR Summary Table specifically states either 
(a) a program has experienced unit-cost-growth in excess of 15% or (b) a program has experienced a 
Nunn–McCurdy breach. 
16 A program is noted as having a Nunn–McCurdy breach if, and only if, a SAR Summary Table 
specifically states a program has experienced a Nunn–McCurdy breach. 
17 The number 0 denotes no reported high unit-cost-growth. The number 1 denotes unit-cost-growth at or 
above the significant unit-cost level but below the critical unit-cost level, whereas 2 indicates unit-cost-
growth at or above the “critical” unit-cost level. The number 3 denotes the statement that unit-cost-growth 
or an NM breach occurred but gives no indication of the level of the problem. 
18 The number 0 denotes no reported NM breach; 1 indicates a significant unit-cost breach; 2 indicates a 
critical unit-cost breach; and 3 implies a statement that an NM breach occurred but does not give an 
indication of the severity of the infraction. 
19 NB: A program is assumed not to have incurred high unit-cost or an NM breach if a SAR Summary 
Table did not explicitly state that such an event had occurred. This may be an erroneous assumption, 
especially for data before the 2006 revision of NM. 
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19. DDG 51 0 0 
20. E-2D AHE (Advanced Hawkeye) 0 0 
21. EA-18G 0 0 
22. F/A-18E/F 1 1 
23. F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) 1 1 
24. FAB-T (Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-
Sight Terminals) 0 0 
25. FCS (Future Combat System) 2 0 
26. FMTV (Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles) 2 0 
27. GBS (Global Broadcast Service) 0 0 
28. Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B) 2 2 
29. GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket 
System) 2 2 
30. H-1 UPGRADES (4BW/4BN) 2 0 
31. HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket 
System) 0 0 
32. JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
Missile) 2 2 
33. JAVELIN  1 1 
34. JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) 0 0 
35. JPATS (Joint Primary Aircraft Training 
System) 2 2 
36. JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon)–
BASELINE/BLU-108 2 0 
37. JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon)–UNITARY 2 0 
38. JTRS GMR (Joint Tactical Radio System 
Ground Mobile Radio) 1 1 
39. JTRS HMS (Joint Tactical Radio System 
Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit) 0 0 
40. JTRS NED (Joint Tactical Radio System 
Network Enterprise Domain) 0 0 
41. LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) 0 0 
42. LONGBOW APACHE  2 0 
43. LPD 17 2 0 
44. MH-60S 1 1 
45. MIDS (Multifunctional Information 
Distribution System) 0 0 
46. MINUTEMAN III GRP (Guidance 
Replacement Program) 2 0 
47. MINUTEMAN III PRP (Propulsion 
Replacement Program) 0 0 
48. MP RTIP (Multi-Platform Radar Technology 
Insertion Program) 0 0 
49. MPS (Mission Planning System) 0 0 
50. MUOS (Mobile User Objective System) 0 0 
51. NAVSTAR GPS (Navigation Signal Timing 
and Ranging Global Positioning System)–
SPACE & CONTROL 0 0 
52. NAVSTAR GPS (Navigation Signal Timing 
and Ranging Global Positioning System)–
USER EQUIPMENT 0 0 
53. NMT (Navy Multiband Terminal) 0 0 
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54. NPOESS (National Polar-Orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellite System) 2 2 
55. P-8A MAA (Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft) 0 0 
56. PATRIOT PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3) 0 0 
57. PATRIOT/MEADS (Medium Extended Air 
Defense System) CAP–FIRE UNIT  0 0 
58. PATRIOT/MEADS (Medium Extended Air 
Defense System) CAP–MISSILE 0 0 
59. SBIRS (Space Based Infrared Systems)– 
High 1 1 
60. SDB I (Small Diameter Bomb I) 0 0 
61. SM-6 (Extended Range Active Missile) 0 0 
62. SSDS (Ship Self-Defense System) 0 0 
63. SSGN (Guided Missile Submarines) 0 0 
64. SSN-774 (Virginia Class) 1 1 
65. STRYKER  0 0 
66. T-45TS 2 0 
67. TACTICAL TOMAHAWK 0 0 
68. T-AKE (Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship) 0 0 
69. TRIDENT II MISSILE 2 0 
70. VH-71 (Presidential Helicopter) 0 0 
71. WGS (Wideband Gapfiller Satellites) 0 0 
   
Number of programs 31 18 
   
ARH (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter) 1 1 
ASDS (Advanced Deployable System) 2 2 
Black Hawk Upgrade 2 0 
CH-47F 2 0 
EEVL (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) 2 0 
EFV (Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle) 2 2 
F-22 1 1 
FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and 
Below) 1 1 
Land Warrior 2 2 
MH-60R 2 0 
Navy Area TBMD 3 3 
V-22 2 0 
   
Number of programs 13 8 
   
Overall number of program 44 26 
Figure 10: Programs that reported unit-cost-growth and/or Nunn–McCurdy breach, 1998–2008 
66 
 


















Appendix C: Contingency Tables and Fisher’s Exact Tests of 
Independence 
 
 Breach No breach Total 
Army 3 9 12
Navy 3 25 28
Air Force 8 15 23
DoD 4 4 8
Total 18 53 71
P-value: 0.001 









No breach 23 17 13 53
Breach 2 4 12 18








No breach 23 30 53
Breach 2 16 18
Total 25 46 71
P-value: 0.021  
Figure 12: Small NM group, NM breach by quantity change 
 
Baseline estimate 
 <$3,500B between >$7,950B Total 
No breach 21 15 17 53
Breach 2 9 7 18




 <$3,500B >$3,500B Total 
No breach 21 32 53
Breach 2 16 18




 <$3,500B between >$7,950B Total 
No breach 20 13 20 53
Breach 0 6 12 18







 <$3,500B >$3,500B Total 
No breach 20 33 53
Breach 0 18 18
Total 20 51 71
P-value: 0.002 








No breach 44 9 53
Breach 14 4 18
Total 58 13 71
P-value: 0.726 








No breach 30 23 53
Breach 6 12 18
Total 36 35 71
P-value: 0.107 








No breach 25 28 53
Breach 1 17 18












No breach 12 20 21 53
Breach 11 3 4 18










                                                 
20 All programs experienced a change in estimating cost. Because a chi-square test of independence cannot 












No breach 3 17 33 53
Breach 5 3 10 18












No breach 9 19 25 53
Breach 5 0 13 18












No breach 19 12 22 53
Breach 2 3 13 18
Total 21 15 35 71
P-value: 0.005 
Figure 16: Small NM group, NM breach by cost category 
 
Largest cost category     
 Estimating Quantity Engineering Schedule Support total 
No 
breach 16 16 15 5 1 53 
Breach 9 3 2 2 2 18 
total 25 19 17 7 3 71 
P-value: 0.001 
 
Largest absolute cost category     
 Estimating Quantity Engineering Schedule Support total 
No 
breach 27 16 8 0 2 53 
Breach 7 6 2 2 1 18 
total 34 22 10 2 3 71 
P-value: 0.002 






 Breach No breach Total 
Army 7 5 12
Navy 9 19 28
Air Force 11 12 23
DoD 4 4 8
Total 31 40 71
P-value: 0.004 










No breach 19 15 6 40
Breach 6 6 19 31









No breach 19 21 40
Breach 6 25 31
Total 25 46 71
P-value: 0.023 
Figure 19: Large NM group, NM breach by quantity change 
 
Baseline estimate 
 <$3,500B between >$7,950B Total 
No breach 19 11 10 40
Breach 4 13 14 31




 <$3,500B >$3,500B Total 
No breach 19 21 40
Breach 4 27 31




 <$3,500 between >$7,950 Total 
No breach 17 13 10 40
Breach 3 6 22 31








 <$3,500B >$3,500B Total 
No breach 17 23 40
Breach 3 28 31
Total 20 51 71
P-value: 0.003 










No breach 36 4 40
Breach 22 9 31
Total 58 13 71
P-value: 0.062 










No breach 27 13 40
Breach 9 22 31
Total 36 35 71
P-value: 0.002 








No breach 22 18 40
Breach 4 27 31












No breach 5 17 18 40
Breach 18 6 7 31








                                                 
21 All programs experienced a change in estimating cost. Because a chi-square test of independence cannot 













No breach 3 15 22 40
Breach 5 5 21 31












No breach 8 17 15 40
breach 6 2 23 31












No breach 17 11 12 40
Breach 4 4 23 31
Total 21 15 35 71
P-value: 0.000 
Figure 23: Large NM group, NM breach by cost category 
 
Largest cost category     
 Estimating Quantity Engineering Schedule Support total 
No 
breach 10 14 10 5 1 40 
Breach 15 5 7 2 2 31 
total 25 19 17 7 3 71 
P-value: 0.000 
 
Largest absolute cost category     
 Estimating Quantity Engineering Schedule Support total 
No 
breach 21 11 6 0 2 40 
Breach 13 11 4 2 1 31 
total 34 22 10 2 3 71 
P-value: 0.003 
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